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ABSTRACT

This thesis deals with the events

~ld

issues which

were connected with the 1935 gubernatorial election.
There is first a brief sketC!1 of Kentucky politics prior
to the 1935 election.

Particular interest is given to the

history of the Lemocratic Party and the split which
occurred in it at the turn of the
A

~~eat

centur~.

deal of attention is given to the factional

struggles which occurred in the period between 1931 and

1935.

The controversy and drive for a primary law is

discussed in detail.
Because of the nature of the primary law enacted 1n

1935 two primary elections were held before the Lemocrat1c
Party selected its cand idates.

'l'he candidates, issues and

significance of each primary 1s di8cussed.

Also included

1s an analysis of t he vote g1 ven to the candidates in both
parties.
In a like manner, the campaigns of the two gubernatorial nominees are discussed.

The significance of the

results of the election and the factors which were responsible for its outcome are presented.
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CHAPThh 1
PRl!.LUL.I:. TO

IISHAl:-~t-l0N'Y

It was cold And rainy across most of Kentucky as
voters went to the polls in 1935 to register their choice
for the state's next governor.

Lespite the inclement

weather a large number of voters turned out, thus climaxing
one of the bitterest political contests in the history of
the Commonwealth.

Few topics intrigue Kentuckians as much

as the question of who will be victorious at the next
election.

However, most controversy is concentrated in the

weeks just prior to the primary and general election.

But

in 1935 voters were subjected to over ten months of almost
constant political fighting and campaigning.

v.:!thin less

than a year, a special session of the state legislature had
been called under dramatic circumstances and three elections
had occurred.

Before the events of 1935 can be understood,

a brief look must be taken at Kentucky's political history.
Before the Civil War political power had been largely
vested in the hands of vJhig slaveholders.

Much of the Whig

Party's strength in the state had been oonoentrated in the
Central Bluegrass region.

Not only was the area predomi-

nantly Whig, but it was from this region that most of the
Party's leaders came.

Other areas of Whig strength were

found in the Eastern Mountain and pennyroyal regions of

1

2

the state.
Al though the 1lhig Party, under the leadership of Henry
Clay, successfully controlled the state in this period, the
lemocratic Party was not without support among Kentucky
voters.

The extreme western corner of the state, commonly

called the Jackson Purchase area, was overwhelmingly Lamocratic.

There were aleo pockets of Democratic strength in

Northern Kentucky along the Ohio River and in a few Southeastern counties, notably Pike, Carter and }i:orf"an.
The death of Whig leader Henry Clay, the intensifying
of the slavery issue and finally the Civil \,'ar all produced
tfthe necessary solvent to destroy well-fixed political
habits. ,,1

After the \'''ar Between the States most of the old

slaveholding Whigs joined the Democratic Party.

The Lemo-

cratic Party then became an alliance between the small
farme~of

western and central Kentucky and the Bluegrass

"Bourbons".

During the Civil War and in the years immedi-

ately after the Republican party attracted little support
in the state.

It was at first considered by most to be a

radical party.

After the war the Reconstruction policies

of the Republican Party made the party even more unpopular
in the state.

But gradually, as the bitterness engendered

by the conflict faded the Republican Party gradually united
the mountain Whigs, the emancipated Negroes and some old
Jacksonian Democrats.

However, the Republican coalition

lJasper B. Shannon and Ruth McQuown, Presidential
Politics in Kentuck
l8~ -19 8 (Lexington: UnIversIty of
Kentucky Press, 19 0 , p. 3 •

3

presented little threat to the powerful lemocratic alliance.
The only hope for a Republican victory la;y in a split among
Lemocratic forces.
thirty years.

Such a split did not occur for almost

The Democratic coalition was a powerful com-

bination which managed to maintain its ascendancy until

1895.
Luring the last decade of the nineteenth century
Kentuci;:y, like much of the nation, was beset by political
and social unrest.

This was the period when the Populist

movement was growing and giving expression to the discontent of farmers across the South and West.
an

Kentucky as

af~icultural

state had suffered from the severe decline

in farm prices.

The frustration and discontent of farmers

with the economic situation had been demonstrated in 1891
when the Populist candidate for governor of the state had
polled over twenty-five thousand votes. 2 "This widespread
suffering among farmers was to have great repercussions in
Kentucky politics for a number of years. 1t3
By 1891 the Democratic Party in the state was becoming divided over the silver question.

In that year

conservative Lemocrats successfully opposed the nomination
of P. Wat Hardin "who they thought was tainted not with
Populism, but with too much leaning to isms, chief among
2Judge Charles Kerr (ed.), History of KentDckl
(Chicago: The American Historical Society, 1922), II,
1006.

3Shannon and MCQuown, Presidential Politics, p.

64.

1+
which was free silver.,,4

Supported by conservative lemo-

crats, John Y. Brown received the nomination and was subsequently elected governor.
Very early in his administration, Gover'nor Brown and
his Secretary of State broke with the other members of his
administration.

There followed three years of bitter

factional fighting in the state legislature.

In the inter-

vening time between the 1891 and 1895 gubernatorial
elections, economic conditions in the state had become
worse as a result of the financial panic of 1893.

As the

panic deepened into a depression the heralds of the free
ooinage of silver and adoption of bi-metalism preached a
dootrine which found increasingly receptive ears.

Though

few people understood it, the silver versus gold debate
dominated the 1895 gubernatorial eleotion.
In 1895. Hardin once again sought the nomination, but
this time he ran openly on a free silver platform.
Although conservative Democrats opposed Hardin again, they
were unable to defeat him.

However, they dId sucoeed in

having adopted a gold standard platform for him to run on.S
Still, the opposition to Hardin was great and many of the
more conservative party members refused to support him.
The result was that for the first time in the history of
the state the Republican Party won a [.oubernatorial election.
4George Lee \~ 111is, Kentucky Democracy (Louisville:
Lemocratic Historical Soc iety, 19.35) J II, p. 303.

5.!P.!2..,

p, 301.~.

An even .Q'reater
defection 'VJithin the lemocratic Part;y
..'
occurred the following year in trie preSidential election.
The Great Commoner, v!illism Jenr;ings Bryan, had tremendous
appeal for small farmers across most of t:le state.
grievances were many and of long standing.
been hardest hit by the depression.

Their

The farmers had

They had also been

provoked by the cis criminatory practices of the Louisville
&:

Nashville Railroad ar;d by the resentment against what

they regarded as flHourbon" or BlueGrass domination of the
Lemocratic Party.

To many of these people the issue of

free silver served as a banner for more than the improvement of their economic conditions.

It also became the

rallying point for those who were dissatisfied with the
political order.

For these very reasons, Bryan antagonized

and alienated urban dwellers and the descendants of the old
Whig slaveholders.

Enough Lemocrats were fearful of

Bryants seeming radicalism to give Kentucky's electoral
vote for the first time to a Republican candidate for
President.
In 1896 a majority of Kentucky's Lemocrats were supporters of the Cross of Gold candidate.

However, many of

the party's most influential leaders were opposed to Bryan.
For the most part these leaders were from the growing
urban areas and from the wealthy Bluegrass region.

They

included men such as Henry vlatterson, publisher of the
Courier-Journal, John Y. Brown, and Simon Bolivar Buckner.
The division between the ngold" and "silver" factions

6

in Kentucky's rJ€mocratic Party persisted well into the
present century.

The debate over monetary policy quiokly

faded as a divisive issue, but the split cont1.nue(l.

1896, the silver raotion became the dominant

grot~

After
in the

party, "'rhile many or those who opposed Bryem combined to

form the non-I'uling faction.

But gradually many of the

influential leaders who had opposed Bryan became associated
with the dominant £action.

Although some individuals main-

tained steadfastly their allegiance to one faetion, many
persons moved repeatedly from one side to the other in
search of politically greener pastures.

liespite this, one

faction had managed by a variety of means to maintain its
control of the party and stste government since 1896.

The

dissident faction of the party came to be inoreasingly
composed of young men whose political ambitions had been
thwarted and by men

who

had become for some reason, alien-

ated from the ruling group.

By

1935 this combination of

politicians lion the make lf and alienated political veterans
WliS

large enough and powerful enough to defeat what had

been the dominant faction of the remocratic Party for over
forty years.

Before this political accord wes fashioned,

however, a great deal of political wrangling had transpired.
In the period after the election of 1896, "there

"HiS

born a coalition of political leaders who were identified
wi th the Bourbons t and
Combine. 1I6

~Jhich

was kno'to1D as the Bi-Partisan

As the title nBi-Partisan" ina.ic a. tes, this

6S o hn E. Fenton, Po11ties in the Border state (New
The }Lauaer Press, I9>,n, -P~4b.-~-·--

orleans:

'l

coali tion was composed of both Iemocrats and Republioans,
all of whom espoused a belief in non-partisan government.
Theoretically, a non-partisan government was one which was
conducted solely for the well-being of the populace.

The

decisions and actions of its leaders would not be based on
considerations of party politics.

The leaders of the bi-

partisan coalition contenced that non-partisan government
could be achieved simply by having leaders from both
parties in important positions in the state Government.

In

reality it did not provide either a more efficient or more
democratic government.

Instead it provided one faction of

the Democratic Party with the means of maintaining its
dominance and provided the Republican party with an opportunity to exercise political power in a state that was
predominantly Democratic.

In practice, the Bi-Partisan

government proved non-political only in that it mattered
little to its leaders whether the Republican or Democratic
Party emerged victorious at the polls.

More important than

party affiliation was the candidate's willingness to follow
the guidance of the Combinets leaders who were concerned
solely with perpetuating their own power.
The political strength of this
after the turn of the century.

r~oup

developed slowly

By 1915, when the Bi-

Partisan Combine embarked upon twelve years of uninterrupted rule, the most powerful political leaders in the
state operated within its ranks.

Among its members were

remocrats such as Billy Klair, an influential Lexington

8
politician, and Herb Smith of Harlan, and Republicans such
as Morris Calvin of Lexington.

These men were "area

bosses" who wielded great power within their respective
domains

anc were capable of assuring a large vote to any

candidate supported by the bi-partisan coalition.
these people were urban politicians.

Most of

Aoting in ooncert,

liemocratic and Republioan leaders had learned "that by
effeotive use of the conoentrated and malleable urban
voting populace they could effect a victory for either side
1n a close eleotion, and all elections were close during
this period of Kentucky's political histor~.ft7

This

group's control was maintained through the eleotion ot
governors and state legislators who were willing to submit
to the direction ot the Combinets leaders.

If the Lemo-

cratic nominee proved uncooperative, as was the oase in

1927, the Combine's leaders

merel~

gave their support to

the Republican candidate.
But the principal

n~ans

through which the Combine

exerted its intluence was the Highway Department.

Because

of the increasing demand for new and better roads after
World War I, the Highway Department became a center of new
wealth and power.

Its power derived not only from the huge

sums of money involved in the building and maintenance of
roads, but also from its allocation Df patronage.

Further-

more, the authority of the highway commissioners to
determine the routes of the various ronde provided them
7Ibid., pp. If 6-47.

9

with a means of influencing the legislature and local
governing bocies. B TJuring the period that the state government was under the control of the bi-partisan group, the
IIighwl:lJ Comrtlission was composed of four membeI's. two from
ench of the major political parties.

The equal division of

party members on the Commission supposedly assured
efficient and honest rnanagement.

But in practice, most of

the highway commissione,rs became represerltatives of the
area bosses or an important bi-partisan leader and "were a

unit in promoting their own selfish interests and the
interests of their J:emocratic and Republican supporters. n9
With this type of organizational support the bipartisan combine was able to maintain its control for
almost fifteen years.

But in 1927 friction developed

within the coalition which resulted in its dissolution.
Republicans were largely responsible for the difficulties
which developed.
l~emocratic

They proved less non-partisan than their

counterparts and s.ttempted to exercise a dis-

proportionate amount of power.

In so doing they alienated

the t,emocratic members of the bi-partisan

C oe.lition.

The conflict developed because of a polit1cal feud
between Ben Johnson and J. C. yO. Beckham, two of Kentucky's
most prominent Lemocratic pollticians.

Feuds of a

8J. B. Shannon and others, Political Behavior in
Kentucky 1910-1940 (Lexington: University of kentUCky
Pre 8 S, 19LJ.3 , p. 8.
90rval It]. Baylor, J. Lan Tal.bot: Cha~lon of Good
Government (Louisville: Kentucky Printingorporation,
i 942), p • 83.

10
political nature were not uncommon in the state's history
but few equaled the Johnson-Beckham feud either in longevity or intensity.

The antecedents of the f'eud can be found

in what were originally the Ben Hardin and Charles Wickliff
factions of the l.Jemocra tic Party.

The strugf:leS between

these two Nelson county groups had begun in the 1840's and
the rivalry had continued until Ben Johnson inherited from
his father the leadership of' the Hardin faction, and
Beckham in the tradition of his grandfather Charles A.
Wickliff, became standardbearer for tne House of v.Iickliff.
Both Ben Johnson and J. C. W. Beckham had begun their
political careers during the 1890's.

Both men at some

point in their careers had been aligned with each of the
two factions of the I emocratic Party and thus exemplify the
oonfusing nature of Kentucky politics prior to the 1935
gubernatorial election.
Johnson started his career as a member of the House of
J<epresentatives in It'rankfort in 1885.

"He inmediately

became an important figure in that body and two years
later, • • • was elected speaker of' the House. ulO In 1906,
he was elected to tne Congress of' the United states where
he served until March 4, 1927. 11 After his retirement from
Congress, Johnson was apPointed to the important position
of chairman of the highway Commission.

This position was

10Lexington Herald, Lecember 2, 1934, clipping from
Thomas R. Underwood Collection, Margaret King Library,
tniversity of Kentucky, Lexington, Kentucky.
lllE!.2._

11

offered to him because the Combine at

tl~t

in an election campaign against Beckham.

time was engaged
It was hoped ti...at

J olmson Coulc assist in securing lUS defeat.

Beckham had also enjoyed an active political life.

He

had, as a young politician, assumed the office of governor
after the assassination of Governor William Goebel in 1900.
Before assuming the governorts chair Beckham had been
aligned with the nsilver" faction.

It was during his

administration that many of those who had opposed Bryan
reasserted tne 1r influence in the party.

After leaving the

state capitol he broke his old assooiation with the
dominant faction.
It was during this period that Beckham formed his

close friendship with Percy Haly of l-"'ranltfort.
career also dated back to the 1890' s.

Haly I s

Although he had

served only in minor positions, such as railroad commissioner, he had acquired a
Party.

~~eat

deal of power within the

This power and influence he would use in 1935, and

in so doing would be instrumental in defeating the opposing
faction.
For a number of years after leaving Frankfort, Beckham
served as United States Senator.

Defeated in the 1921

election, he returneo to Kentuck1 and formed a law partnership with Elwood Hamilton, an influential Louisville
Lemocrat. 12

Urged 'by Haly, reformist groups, and others

l2Intcrview with Clay ':lade BailcJ', June 6, 1966.
Bailey was in 1935 Prankfort correspondent for the CourierJournal nne :'s nOl-l Ftrankfort corI'espondent for the Cincinati Enquirer. Hereafter cited as Interview with baIley, lIt.

12

opposed to the bi-partisan coalition,

bec~dJ.alrt

entered the

1927 Lemocratie gubernatorial primary.
TIlis was not the first attempt by a candidate to
defeat the coalition.
from

\~estern

Irl 192,3, a little KnOwn politician

Kentucky, Alben E\arkley, had unsuccessfully

oppesed the Combine t s candidate for the t-eInocratic
nomination.

Unlike Barkley, Beckham was able to defeat the

dominant taction's candidate in the Democratic primary and
thus secured the gubernatorial nomination.

The bi-partisan

coalition then ral11ed behind the Republican candidate,
Flem Sampson.

Although Becldl8!1l presented the Combine with

its most formidable challenge, he suffered deteat in the
general election.

nlUS, control of the government by the

Combine seemed assured for another tour years.

But few

things are as uncertain as Kentucky politics and within two
year>s the Republican ...D~mocratic alliance had been destroyed.
In payment for assistance gi'len in the 1927 campaign,
Governor Sampson retained Ben Johnson as chairman of the
Highway Commission.

Disagreements soon developed between

Johnson and Sampson as both SOUGht to donunate the Higaway
Commission.

In February, 1929, Johnson resigned from the

C01llr1.ission and began actively working to destroy the
Sampson Administration.

He was soon joined in his efforts

by other Lemocratic members of the coalition, such as Billy

Klair and Allie Young of Morehead, who had also clBshed
with Sampson.

The bi-partisan coalition found itself

threatened even more when Democrats of the dissident wing

13
of the party joined the JOMson group ..
The first clash between the S1ll11pson Administration e.nd

the I'Gtnocrats occurred ir.. the 19.30 elec tlOllS.
follo'..Jed, in the 1931
st!'uggle between tile

88813
tllO

There

ion of the C€!leral AS8emhly, a
pas~·v.ge

O'oups avo!' the

of H bill

'¥Jnich placed the control of the highway department in the
l'l.ands of tJ:l.e I.emocrats.

Undor the provisions of thls bill,

appointments and removals on the H1g11way Commission would
be made bJ the lieiltenant governor and the attorney general

sunject to the approval of the state Senato.

Both the

lieutenant governor and flttorney general were Iemocrats
allied with Johnson and thus the measure was clearly
designed to tal!.e from S&'lT'.pson his greatest source of money
and power.

The passage of' th1s so-called "P.iDper Billn by

a f.ernocratic 1T'.ajor-ity in the state legislature meant the
final destruction of bi-partlsan contr0l.
The disharmony provoked in 1927 by the factional
fi6ht1ng in the remocratio primary and the disruption of
tne hi-partisan coali tion served to convin.ce Johnson and

other Lemocratic leaders that the 19.31

gubern~torial

nom1nation would have to be mace in tl:-;;a.nner . .::hich bespoke
ami ty and c encere.
fighting '\olhich

Eoplng to avoid the tyP(; of intra-party

frequer!tl~

characterized m.any Lemocratic

primar-ies, many partJ members advocated the use of a con-

ventiOl} to select th.e party' ~ no:ninee.

These men als(I

undoubtedly believed that through a convention tney could
secure the nomination of candi{lates i'avoral,le to

t.hem~elves

and thus perpetuate their own power.

Accordingly, they

quietly began early in 1931 to gather support for the convention method of nomination.
However, this proposal did not receive the endorsement
of all KentUCKY L,emocrats.

before the Democratic Party

made its final decision as to a convention or primary
election two meetings of the party's Executive Committee
were held.

In addition, the constitutionality of the

state's election laws were contested in the state's courts.
Much of the opposition to the convention came from the
powerful L'emocratic paper, The Courier-J ournal.

Oppos i tion

to the convention system was not strong enough in 1931 to
prevent its adoption but in many ways it foreshadowed the
type of controversy which developed in 1935.
The Democratic convention of' 1931 selected as its
gubernatorial nominee, Ruby Laffoon of Madisonville.
Laffoon's nomination was secured primarily through the
efforts of Ben Johnson and his son-in-law, Lan Talbot. l )
The gubernatorial nomination was made without much
controversy, but a heated struggle developed when the
delegates to the convention sought a running-mate for
Laffoon.

Johnson and Talbot supported Albert B. Chandler

of Versailles, Kentucky, for the nomination.

On the other

hand, Laffoon and his followers, principally Thomas S.
Rhea, opposed Chandler's nomination.

Laffoon opposed

Chandler publicly on the grounds that he was too young and
13Baylor, Talbot, p. l1.~ 7.

1$
inexperienced.

Poss ibly a more impor·tant factor was that

Chandlernad been associated with the minority faction of
the party, while Laffoon was identified with the dominant
faction.

Nevertheless, the Johnson-Young-Talbot will pre-

vailed and Chandler received the nomination.
campai~n

liuring the

differences between Laffoon and Chandler were

submerged and a united ticket was presented to the voters.
But the wounds inflicted in the selection of Chandler never
healed.

Instead they became the first blows in some of the

most intense fighting in the party's hlstorJ'.
The ballots of the 1931 election had hardly been tabulated and Laffoon installed as governor before the
ill-will generated in the nominating convention reappeared,
paving the way for an even more hotly contested battle
over nominating methods in 1935.

The Lemocratic coalition,

which had been formed during the Sampson Administration
and which had skillfully managed the 1931 election, was not
a manifestation of a reconoiliation of Kentucky l"emocrats.
It had been created when both factions found that they
faced a

com~on

foe.

Once Victory had been achieved, the

old animosities and Lmbitions reasserted themselves.

The

remocrats, who had united in their opposition to Sampson,
were once again divided.
The disharmony which plagued the Laffoon admi r;lstration 'Was first evidenced wben Laffoon called for the
enactment of a three per cent sales tax.

This measure, it

was hopec, would help to alleviate some of the economic

16
problems created by the Great Jiepressior:.

It was Laffoon's

eonterltion tha.t the revenue received from the sales tax
would provide the state with the necessary funds to partioipate in federal relief programs.

The governor first

proposed such a measure during the 1932 session of the
state legislature, but the anti-administration forces, led
by Chand leI', Talbot and Allie Young, enc ountered little
difficulty in defes.ting it.
In 193), the Federal government notified Kentucky
that before it could receive the benefits of the F'ederal
Emergenoy Funds, the state would have to provide a required
three million dollars.

After conferring with Federal

Relief rarectoI', Harry Hopkins, La.ffoon issued a call for s.
special session of the General Assembly to meet on August

15, 1933.

This meeting of the legislature was to devise
some means of meeting the demands made by vlashington. l1 ,"

vlhen Laffoon submitted his program to t1:1e legislature, it
centered around what he called "an emergency gross reoeJ.pts

tax.,,15

It was apparent to all that what Laffoon euphe-

m1stioally proposed was a sales tax.

1~e

special session

of the leGislature lasted for more tn.an a month, but
adjourned without passage of the sales tax.

Eackers of

Laffoon could not muster enough votes in either the House
l4LeXington Herald, August 11, 1933, p. 1.
15Commonwealth of Kentucky, Journal of the Extraordinary Session of the Kentucky Senate (Frankfort: The
state Journal Company), August 15, 1933, :). 17.

17
or Senate for the measure.

The governor did succeed in

passing thr'ough the House a one per cent consumer tax, but
this measure

"'8S

defeated in the Senate by the anti-

administration fOT'ces. 16
I;urlng 1932 and 1933, Laffoon" ably assisted by Thomas
f).

Hhea, had been steadily increasing his legislative

support.

Al thour;~1 several cand idates supported by the

r;:overnor had been successful at th.e polls, Laffoon did not
directly seek enactment of the sales tax during the reg111ar 1934 session of the General Assembly.

However, he

took seversl indirect steps toward securing its passage at
a later date.

In a general reorganization of the state

goverm;1ent, Laffoon removed all signifIcant author! ty from
the office of lieutenant governor.
doubtedly directed

again~

t Chandler,

This move was unw~o

by that time was

leading the anti-ad:n1nistration forces in the legislature.
That Laffoon had captured control of the legislature
'Nas furthE'r demonstrated 1n the resolution pAssed shortly
before i ts

adjourr~:nlent.

The resolution !'equested the

q:overnor to ca.ll an ext!'aordlnary session of the General
Assembl:y to

B ct

on appropri at ions a.nd :('evenue measures .17

Laffoon. responding to this request, 'f"€COllVened the legis-

lat.ure in ?1ay, and quickly sought the enactment of a. sales

16~., September 26, 1933, p. 2'(0.
17Commonwealth of Kentucky, Journal of the Kentucky
Senate, RC~U1ar 19311 Session (Fr"lnkfort: The State Journal
Company), V, March 14, 1934, p. 5451.
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bill.

l'his time he succeeded in his

8

ttempt.

The sales tax measure did not get through this session.
unopposed.

Various other taxes were proposed as substi-

tutes for a general sales tax.

Some members of trw legis-

lature advocated a tax on tobaoco, wine or beer.
supported the taxing of cosmetics and soft drinks.

Others
A bill

was introduced whioh would have taxed admissions to places
of amusement and utilities. l8 But all these measures were
rejected and the sales tax adopted.
Passage of the measure proved extremely difficult.
After having twice rejeoted the bill advocated by Laffoon,
tlw House on June 8, 1934, passed the measure by a vote of
fifty-one to forty_seven. l9 In the Senate the bill faced
stiffer opposition.

lespite the tactics of tite Chandler

group, the Senate passed the sales tax bill one week later
by a vote of twenty to seventeen. 20 An indioation of the
relative strength of the two factions in the legislature
is seen in the faot that the sales tax passed both houses
with a one vote majority.
It is not the purpose of this cisoussion to determine
the reasons for Laffoon's advocaoy of the sales tax or to

19House Journal, June 8, 1934, pp. 492-93.
20Commonwea1th of Kentucky, Journal of the Extraordinary Session of the Kentucki Senate (Frankfort: The
State Journal Company), June 5, 1934, p. 287.
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ascertain l>Jhether the measure "Jas necessary to meet the
financial needs of the state.

What is significant for a

study dealing with the 1935 gubernatorial election, is the
fact that the sales tax proved to be one of the most unpopular forms of taxation in the state's his tory.

l,Jhen

the sales tax was enacted it appeared that Laffoon had
achieved a major victory over his political enemies.
While he had defeated the Chandler forces in the 1934 encoun ters, he had at the same time lIDkno'Wingly provided them
with a campaigrl issue in the sales tax.

'filis issue would

become a crucial element in the outcome of the 1935
election.

Laffoon, in signing the sales tax bill, had

remarked:

"In six months time this will be the most

popular law ever enacted in Kentucky.,,21

Contrary to the

governor's expectations the tax became extremely unpopular, and A. B. Chandler, the man who had opposed it for
three years, 'Would be pitted against the Laffoon supported
candidate in the 1935 Lemocratic primary.
the passage of the sales tax,

~allace

much 'Wiser than Laffoon, said:
a trail of broken promises.

Comm.enting on

Embry, a prophet

"It was a good fight over

The taxpayers will be waiting

at the polls in the next election.
over. n22

It t 8 just pa.rtly

Laffoon found opposition not only in the legislature,
but also in the highway departrnent.

After assuming the

21courier-Journal, June 16, 1934, p. 1.
22Baylor, Talbot, P. 2'11.
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office of governor, Laffoon har: 1'e1ns tated Johnson as
chairman of the Hie;hwBJ Commission.
thai; it

weB

It will be recalled

,Johnson who had been :nost responsible for

Laffoon t, nomination in 1931, and for

!:1

few munths the tuo

politicians appeared to work harmoniously together.
Criticizing this relationship, one newspaper

stat~d:

"Omnipotence sits enthroned on Johns on t s de sk • • • .He is
keeper of the state's Conscience, Chancellor of Hoad
E.1Cohequer, Lord High Exeoutioner, office boy and rnail
clerk. n23
It was not long before differences between the two
men began to Appear.

Conflict seems to

hav~

developed

over the attempt of both to control the Highway Commission.

During Laffoon's administration, the Commiss ion

was made up of eight members.

As the differences devel-

oped, the eir;ht quickly ali::ned themselves with either
Johnson or Laffoon.

Laffoon was, for a short period,

prevented from removing those opposed to him by the bill
passed during the Sampson administration which placed the
authority to remove and appoint members in the hands of
the lieutenant governor and attorney general.

Chandler,

as lieutenant governor and a leader of the antiadministration forces, refused to cooperate with Laffoon,
who thus lacked the authority to remove those who aligned

themselves with Johnson.

One of the governor's primary

objectives in the 1934 reorganization of the state
23Lexington lIE raId, I'e cember 2, 1934.
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government was the removal of this authori ty from
Chandler.

He achieved it in the "ouster law" which gave

the governor the authority to dismiss, without explanation
or hearing, any appoultee in the government.

As soon as

the constitutionality of the "ouster law" had been upheld
by the state courts, Laffoon acted.

From Lecember, 1934,

to March, 1935, Johnson and his three supporters on the
Commission, A. P. Plummer, Zach Justice and Charles
Fernell, were all removed by Laffoon.
After his dismissal, Johnson, assisted by Lan Talbot,
joined forces with the anti-administration faction.

TI1US,

by 1935 this faction counted among its leaders, Lieutenant Governor Chandler, Allie Young, Ben Johnson and Ian
Talbot, all of whom are among the craftiest politicians
ever produced in the stat.e.

Eventually J. C. W. Beckham

also would align himself with the anti-administration
faction and thus make complete the coalition which would
do battle \dth the Laffoon forces for oontrol of the state
govern"'TIent.
In the early part of the struggle the Laffoon forces
seel~d

to enjoy an overwhelming advantage.

They possessed

the resources, both human and mat6rial, of the state
government, and the assistance of a powerful political
organization which maintained close ties with oounty
officials.

The anti-administration forces, at that time,

had little financial support and only the nucleus of a
state-wide political machine or organization.

Confronted

b~J \-lhat appc arec to be insurmcuntsble disadvantages, the

anti-8tiministratlon '-roup be:gF<n to gather the funds rlu:oed

to Har,e
sny

('3

~rl"'or

toU.gh political ca,mraigI1.

Anc they .,latched for

on thE' ps.rt of the acministrat:i.on l'yv:.ich 'Would

r.:;rovi(le t.hE':m 'Ld th a chance to l~!"ove their

O"1!:

I.e.ffoen prov1d(~c them \llth such an opportunity
dec idee to oppose a primary election.

position.
When

he

CHAPTER II
PHlMARY OR CONVL}I;TION

In the early months of 1935, both the anti-admlnistration faction and those who aligned themselves with
Governor Laffoon turned their attention to the task of
securing the Democratic gubernatorial nomination.

Both

groups were vitally interested in the method of nomination
the party would use to select its nominees.

Governor

Laffoon and his supporters endorsed the calling of a
nominating convention, convinced that they could thus
oontrol the seleotion of candidates. l Those who endorsed
a convention pointed to the taot that a convention had
been held in 1931 to select the party's candidate and its
ohoice had enjoyed overwhelming success in the general
election.

Implicit in their argument was the idea that

the convention had been a major cause of the party's
Victory.
The anti-administration forces realized that there
would be 11ttle hope of obtaining the nomination for a
member of thelr faction ln a convention oontrolled by the
Laffoon administration.

Thus, Chandler and others advo-

cated nOminating the party's candidates in a direct
lInterview with Clay ~ade Bal1ey, February 21, 1966.
ilereafter cited as Interview with BB11e~ I.
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primsr~.

This group also had a powerful argument in the

fact that the Iemocratic Party had traditionally used the
direct primary to nominate its candidates.

A brief look

at the history of the primary in Kentucky will serve to
explain their arguments and much of the controversy which
arose in January, 1935.
The direct primary in Kentucky has had a record of
gradual legal transformation.

The first legislation (;ealing with primaries was enacted in 1880. 2 This early act

was limited in its provisions, permitting only the most
populated counties to nominate candidates for local
offices in primaries. 3

Following the example of many

other states, Kentucky enacted a law in 1892 whicll made
the primary

applic~ble

state offices.

to the nomination of candidates for

Under the provisions of this act primaries

were not made compulsory but instead became optional.

The

authority to call a primary was vested in the "governing
authority of the political parties."
did not lead in the direct primary

Although Kentucky

moveme~t,

it did

pioneer in the movement for the enrollment of party
voters.

ttThe law of 1892 provided that at the regular

registration voters might make a declaration of party
allegiance.

It also made provision for the use of the

2Charles Edward Merriam and Louise Overacker, Primary
Elections (Chicago: The Universit~ of Chicago Press,

1928),

p.

17.

3~.

2$

registration lists by the political parties at the primary
e lee tions • n4
I)uring the next twenty years conventions and primaries were used by both political parties to choose their
candidates.

But with the passage of time, Lemoerats came

to look with increasing favor upon the direct primary.
Then ttafter the notorious convention of 1899 in which
William Goebel was nominated in a long drawn out and
internecine fiu;ht, • • • which ended eventually in the
assassination of Goebel, the convention system became unpopular with the Democratic party."S
As the direct primary gained in

popularit~,

it became

increasingly apparent that the provisions of the antiquated laws would have to be revised.

The 1892 law had

not specified a day for the holding of primaries.

It

required only that if a primary was called that it be held
at least forty days before the general election, anc that
public notice be £:;i ven of the primary.

As a resul t of the

inadequacies of the old law the political parties often
held their primaries on different days, and frequently
with only a minimum of public attention being drawn to the
fact that a primary was scheduled.
caused confusion and

rese~tment

These" snap primaries, ft

among voters.

The most important rea80n for the increased popularity

,+~.,

fl.

31.

5Sharmon and others, Political Behavior in Kentucky,
p. 9.
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of the direct primary was the odious image which the convention system gradually acquired.

The contentiouB manner

in w;-;,ich conventions were often conducted and the scandalous stories of corruption and political bargaining which
circulated after each convention convinced many people
that the system would have to be discarced.

In addition

to this criticism, there was growing during this period an
ever mounting belief that the "people" should have the
determining voice in the nomination of their candidates.
Consequently, the direct primary came to be viewed as a
more democratic method of nomination.
As a result of

tl~se

other states during the

factors, Kentucky, like many

ProJ~ressive

Era, enacted a new law

in 1912 which made primary elections mandatory for the
nomination of all candidates for state offices.

This new

act also corrected the worst abuses of the earlier legislation by assigninr, one day, the first Saturday in August
6
of each year, for the holding of primary elections.
Furthermore, under the provisions of the new law there
would be no conventions, and it would not be possible for
"snap primaries" to occur; both political parties wou2.d
select their candidates on the same day throu+;hout the
state.
I/espite the general acelaim which the 1912 law
received, in less then a decade the direct primary had
6John I. Carroll (ed.), The Kentuoky Laws. Statutes
(Louisville: The Baldwin Law Book Company, 1918), III,
312.

once

a.r~aln

come under c!'iticnl f'ttt!l.ck in Kentucky and

across the nation.

!\lthough repeal of the dlrect primary

was given serious consideration in many states, only in a
few was such a measure actually enacted. 7 One of these
states was

!~entuck;Y,

which in 1920 repealed the mandatory

provision of the primary law, but only as it applied to
nominations for state offices.

Candidates for county,

municipal or national offices still
primary.

~lad

to be chosen in a

Under the provisions of the 1920 law political

parties were given the option of choosing their candidate
for state offices either in a primB.ry or s convention.
The authority to choose the method of nomination was given
to the governing authority of the parties. 8

A significant :factor in the repeal of the primary law
was that the action was taken under a Republican administration and Republicans in Kentucky had traditionally
supported the convention system.

This

s\~port

existed for

many reasons, all of which derived basically from the fae t
that Republicans were in a minority in the state.

Because

of this, the RepublIcan Party lacked the financial resources that the Democratic Party possessed, and primaries
are, in most instances, more expensive than conventions.
Furthermore, because its

onl~

hope for success at the

polls lay in united opposition or in an alignment such as
7!1el"'r1o.:.n and Overacker, Primary r.:lectiqnfl,

D.

106.

8'~Tilliam FdwA.l"d Bald'uin (ed.), Carroll';<3 ICuntnck
Statutes (Louisville: The Standard Printing Co.,
p.

fl3l.

>,
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had existed under the bi-partisan rule, the Republicans
rarely had more than one strong candidate for any single
office.

Fewer in number and lacking equal financial

resources, the Republicans would only destroy their own
party if they indulged in the type of intra-party
struggles which characterized many of the Lemocratic
primaries.
The provisions of the 1920 law worked very well for

both parties for eleven years.

The Republicans, in most

cases, chose their candidates in conventions, while Lemocrats picked theirs in primaries.

Then, in 1931, the

r;emocrats, for the first time since 1899, nomina ted their
canaidates in a convention.

Ifhe contl'oversy which had

been generated in 1931 and the division which developed
within the Laffoon administration served as preliminaries
for tile struggle waged on behalf of the primary in 1935.
The question of how the party would nominate its
gubernatorial

cand~ate

in 1935 was first raised

b~

anti-

administration leaders when they sought to pass a compulsory pri.ma.r:i act during the 1934 session of the
Assembly.

Gene',~al

These efforts were blocked by the administra-

tion.
As the time approached for the party to choose its
candidates and as the number of politicians who openly
sought the nomination increased, widespread speculation
was generated as to the course of action the temocratic
Executive Committee would take.

As the interest increased,
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so did public

endol~sement

sentiment woule

:~ave

of' the direct roriman'.

'llhls

remained a latEcnt force except for

the work of a very skillful and shrev/d journalist. 9
r-1ore than any other person, Howard

i~.

Henderson,

!t'rankfort correspondent for the Courler-,;ourna,l, was responsible for orGanizing and giving expression to public
opposition to the convention system. lO An experienced
observer of Kentucky politics, Henderson combined a keen
intelliGence with a zealous devotion to honest and efficient goverrunent.

Few politicians or administrations

escaped his crusading scrutiny.

fie "exposed numerous

scandals during his term at Frankfort and incurred the
bitter enmity of' politicians who were his victims."ll
ItRuthless lt in many ways, he was undaunted by the attacks
of his enemies.

And he possessed, in the circulation of

the Courler-Journal, an influential and powerful means of
communicating his findines to the public.
In the latter part of

19~~,

Henderson began to urge

the calling of a primary in his column, "From the State
Capitol. 1I

His efforts were suppor-ted by the Couriar-

Journal and its publisher, Robert

~orth Bingl~m.

In 1935

Bingham was serving as Ambassacor to Great Britain, but
he had been aligned with the anti-administration wing of
9Interview with Bailey, III.

IOllli·
llY·1ark Ethridge to Olivia Frederick, April 15, 1966,
in tae possession of thE author.
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the party for a number of years and had actively worked to
improve its position in the state.

Bingham was closely

associated with J. C. W. Beckham and Percy Haley, both of
whom were identified with the dissident faction of the
Lemocratic Party.
The newspaper, backed by Bingham and the determined
assistance of Henderson, embarked upon an intensive campaign designed to arouse public opinion in support of the
primary to such proportions that it could be ignored only
by those who courted defeat at the polls.

Early in 1935,

Henderson began canvassing counties throughout the state,
asking officials and voters their preference as to a
primary or convention.

According to Henderson, the

responses to these questions indicated overwhelming sup12
port for the primary.
This canvass of public opinion preceded the statewide poll taken by the paper early in 1935.

On January

16, the Courier-Journal announced that it had mailed
250,000 ballots to remocrats and Republicans throughout
the state.

On these they were to indicate their prefer-

ence for a primary or convention.

These ballots, the

paper stated, had been sent to a cross-section of men and
women of different occupations and professions.

The

number of ballots used in the poll represented a fairly
large sample of Kentuoky voters.

In the 1931 guber-

natorial election, approximately 820,000 votes had been
12CouriiJr-Journal, Janll.ary 19, 1935, p. 1.
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cast and a year later about 975,000 KentuckirulS voted in
the Presidential election.

The C01..1I'ier-J ournal ballots

thus represented more than one voter for every four who
werlt to the polls in 1932.13
When the returned ballots were counted, they indicated that the majority of the people in the state
favored a primary.

The poll received the attention of

newspapers across the entire state.

One of the reasons

that the poll attracted so much interest was that on the
day after it was announced, a meeting of the Lemocratic
Executive Committee was unexpectedly called and scheduled
to meet before the deadline date for return of the ballots.
When the call was issued for the Executive Committee
meeting the Courier-Journal requested those who had
received ballots to return them as quiCkly as possible, so
that the count could be made before the committee
convened. 14

Obviously, the newspaper hoped that if the

returns were favorable to the primary, it would convince
the Cotmn.ittee to oall a primary.
On January 27, the day before the oommittee met, the
paper reported that participants in the poll preferred
the primary by a vote of 60,207 to 5,558 - a ratio of
eleven to one. 15 The final tabulation of ballots in the
poll was published on February 5.

Of the 250,000 ballots

13~.,

January 16, 1935, p. 1.

14lE!£.,

Januar~ 17, 1935, p. 1.

l5l£!£., January 27, 1935, p. 3.
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mailed, 71,583 were returned.

Of these, 65,571, or

indicated a preference for the primary.

91.6~;,

Lemocrats

returned 47,9ltl ballots endorsing the primary as oompared
with 3,710 who favored a convention.

Hepublioans in the

state registered a vote of 17,640 for the primary and only
2,293 for th.e convention system. 16
Although the Executive Committee disregarded the
Courier-Journal poll and other evidences of public support
for a primal'S, the poll did affect later events.

It

demonstrated to Lieutenant Governor Chandler that widespread support for

8.

primary existed, and this was a

faotor in his decision to call a speoial session of the
legislature for the purpose of

enactin~

a oompulsory

primary law. 17
It seems likely that the increasing interest evinced
in a primary also influenced the actions of the admlnistration.

As

the sentiment for a primary election

increased, a meeting of the Democratic Exeoutive Committee
was called by the oommi ttee chairman, Bailey v:ootton, to

determine by what method the party would select its
18
candidates.
The meeting was scheduled for January 28,
a date earlier than the

C

ommlttee customarily met and

prior to the time that the results of the poll would be
161l?!2.., February

5,

1935, p. 1.

17Interview with Albert b. Chandler, LeXington,
Kentucky, I,ecember 6, 1965. Hereafter cited as Interview
with Chandler.
l8LeXington Herald, January 19, 1935, p. 1.
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conclusive.

In liGht of the a.ction that the committee

took, it seems likclJi tha t the administration hoped to act
before a gre.fl. t deal of P\1::; lie it;y ccou.ld te :;:Len to the
results of the poll.

It !ias apparent that the efforts of

the Courier-Journal to secure a pr'imary

~as

arousing wide-

spread interest.

As the daJ neared for the meeting of the Executive
Committee, the movement for a primery

r~rew

in strength.

SensinG public support for the primru:'y, James Richmond and
Frederick \!allis, both announced aspirants for the remocratic gubernatorial nomination, publicly endorsed the
direct

~)rimary.

.r. majority of Kent'.;.cky's

con~ressional

delegation urged their party's chief executive body to
order a primary.

Alben Barkley, United states Senator

from Kentucky, in a letter to a committee member, endorsed

the primary by declaring:
Regardless of the wishes 01' the interests
of any candidate for any office, the
right of the people to control their
government, to p8~tlcipat6 in it, to
demand faithful servi~e of it, and to see
that it 1s administered for their welfare,
is a fundamental r 19ht to vJhioh all
selfish ambitions ~ust yield. 20
In an attempt to impress the Executive Commdttee

~lth

the

importance of its decision, Berkley warned its members,
ttyou may hold the destIny of the party in your own
hand s • tt 21
20rhe Louisville Herald Post, January 15, 1935, p. 1.
2lcourier-Journal, January 24, 1935, p. 1.

In addition to the exhortations of prominent political figures, many of the newspapers in the state were
also urging the cormnittee to call a primary.
partioularly true of the Demooratic press.

'fhis was
Commenting on

this issue, the Interior Standard said in late January:
If the cesires of the candidates • • ••
are not of influence on the oommittee,
then the almost solid demand of the
Kentucky Democratic press • • • ought to
cause the committee to order the primary
method of making these nominations. 22
The Federal administration and the national party
also manifested an interest in the decision of the committee.

Kentucky was the only state holding a major

election in 1935.

For this reason both of the national

parties Bought to use a win in the state as a herald of
victory in the 1936 Presidential election.

On the day

before the oommittee met Postmaster General James A.
Farley, National Chairman of the Democratic Party,
requested that the committee respeot the wishes of the
voters by calling for a primary.
The interest of the national party was also demonstrated in the unexpected trip of Senator Barkley from
Washington to Frankfort to address the oommittee.
"Politicians quickly saw behind Senator Barkley's hurried
trip to Frankfort the hand of the President himself," for
it was widely known in politioal circles that the
"President and other leaders of the national administration
22!a! Stanford Interior standard, January 25, 1935,
p. 1.
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had sought reports on the Kentucky political situation. 1t23
Senator Barkley began his address to the Executive
Commi ttee by reading a letter from the President.

In the

presidential communication, President Roosevelt Expressed
'tthe hope that in your state, without regard to political
parties, the greatest freedom and widest opportunity may
be accorded to all the people for participation in the
selection of candidates as well as to their final
selection. n24

The President optimistically concluded the

letter by saying:
indulge the hope and belief that
in your state, and in all states, those
who are charged with party responsibility
will preserve and guarantee these indisputablecrlghts to the people of every
c18ss. 2 ;7
May I

After he had delivered Roosevelt's message, Barkley
personally urged the committee to adopt the direct
primary.

"It is rather tragic,1I Barkley stated, "for 8

Democrat to appeal before a I;emocratic committee and ask:
it to be democratic."26
When Senator Barkley concluded his speech, the committee heard an hour and a half address by Governor
Laffoon.

The governor defended his support of a CODven-

tion by asserting that "there are times when it is best to
23The Herald Post, January 28, 1935, p. 3.
21+Courier-Journal, January 29, 1935, p. 3.
25~.

26Lexington Herald, January 29, 1935, p. 1.
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nominate in a primary and there are times when those
nominees should be chosen in a convention.,,27
implied that 1935 was one of those times when

Laffoon
8

convention

should be used but refused to explain why it was so.

The

governor did say that he favored a oonvention "beoause I
want to see Kr. Roosevelt renominated in 1936. 1128
later refused to clarify this statement.

He

Almost one half

of Governor Laffoon's message was devoted to a denunciation of the Courier-Journal.

He further implied that a

convention would prevent this newspaper from obtaining
oontrol of the state government.
Following Governor Laffoon's speech the members of
the committee were urged by two of the gubernatorial
aspirants to respond to the desires of the people and
adopt a primary.

After hearing these two pleas, the

commi ttee voted.
In 1935, the Democratio Executive Committee was
composed of twenty-five men and twenty-five women.

Two

men and two women were chosen from eaoh of the eleven
congressional districts Which had existed prior to 1930.
In addition, six members were chosen from the state-atlarge. 29 It is significant to note that "the governor,
in effect, controlled the Executive Committee through the
27~.

28Courier-Journal, January 29, 1935, p. 1.
291£.!2...
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use of patronage. u30
In less ttUl.n three hours from the time the committee
had begun its meeting, the ballots had been cast and the
results announced.

The committee returned a vote of

thirty to twenty in favor of a convention.
congressional d 1s trlcts,

IS 1x

Of the eleven

voted for a convention, three

for a primary and two we!'e evenly divided .3 1
mittee also decided

tl~t

'I'ba com-

the nominating convention would

meet at Lexington on !1ay 14.

This state-wide convention

was to be preceded by county conventions where delegates
to the state convention would be chosen.

The county con-

ventions were to be held on May 11.
A question that must be raised and answered is why
the Executive Committee took action which opposed overwhelming public support for a primary.

In so doing the

committee members appeared to reject a basic principle of
democratic government.

By their actions they were saying

that public officials did not have the duty to remain
responsive to the desires of a majority of the qualified
electors.

For the privilege of nominating by convention,

those in control of the committee willingly subjected
themselves to a great deal of critioism.
then, must have been considerable.

The reward,

It was, in faot,

control of the state government for the next four years,
for it was generally recognized that the

Lemoc~ats

30Interview with Chandler.
3lCourier-Journal, February

S, 1935,

p. 2.

would
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win the next election.

The selection of ternocratic

candidates assumed for both factions a great impo:>tance.

tlhile

an~

candidate supported by the administration would

enjoy an advantage in a primary, the Laffoon forces liars
confident of controlling a convention.

'rhus, they \\lould

be in a much safer position if the choice

WIS

made by a

convention.
The administration was assured of controlling a convention because of the intrinsic nature of the system.
'theoretically, delegates to state conventions were chosen
by party members at the county level.

In practice, little

interest was demonstrated in most county conventions
except by those who had a vested interest, principally
those who owec their livelihood to the state administration.

In most cases, the selection of delegates was left

to a select few who were easily guided by the administration. 32 Thus, it is easy to see why the Laffoon forces
placed their reliance on nomination by convention.
Reaction to the committee's decision was immediate.
Newspapers from all regions of the state responded in an
indignant l1'1ftnner.

"The action of the committee," the

Times Star of Covington, declared, "leaves condltions in
the I;emocratic Party in Kentucky in a 'sorry mess,
amounted to saying to the 'rank and file
damned. It 33

t

t

and

of IJemocrats be

Expressing sentiments similar to those of the

32 Interview with Chandler.

33The Covln[:ton 'rime s-Star, January 29, 193.5, p. 1.
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!J.'imes-S ta.!', the Paduoah Sun Democrat c'!eclg,red:
The committee hasn't l€ft itself a leg
to stand on. The majority of its
membe~s by their action have admitted,
almost blatantly, that they are nothing
but puppets to a machine wLlch counts
its obligations to the national party
as little as it does those to rea~
Lemocrats within the state • • • • 34
Once the committee had made its decision, some newspapers l,.,r1:1ich hac earlier endorsed the pr'imary, took a
conciliatory attitude, urging harmony and unity.

The

Interior Standard, exemplifying this declared:
The committee has spoken. While in
our opinion, it did not represent
e1 ther press, peoplf: or national or
state leaders, other than the
Governor, it is now the duty of all
good Ilemccrsts to turn out in l1"J8.SS
conventions and elect the best men
possible to select as delegates to
the Lexington conventlon.35
There were also papers which approved the action of

the committee.

However's most of th.ese approached the

dec 1s ion in an apologetic manner.

For

ip..13 tance,

the

Richmond raily Resister argued that "the committee made a
deoision whioh it consIdered to be fot' tl1e best interests
of t~le p art 3. "36
Many Republicans saw in the action of the Lemoorati.c
Executive Committee an opportunity to improve their

OWll

34Paducah Sun Lemocrat, January 29, 193.5, clipping in
Thomas Underwood Collection, Archives Livision, Margaret
King Library, tTnlversity of Kentucky.

35rnterior Standard, February 1, 1935, p. 2.
36R1ehmond r'sily Resistet:, Januttt'J- 29, 1935, p. 3.
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election chances.

"The horizon breaks brightly for the

Republican Party in 1935, a brightness not seen for many
years," the Harlan Daily Enterprise optimistically stated.
The paper further urged Republicans in Kentucky to nominate their candidates by primary, and by so dr!1:;g secure
"the mass of votes alienated by the Democratic Executive
Committee's aotions.,,37
It is extremely difficult to ascertain now the reaction of the general public to the decision of the
committee.

Many persons attempted to create the impres-

sion that voters were indignant over events.

It is doubt-

ful that the public was quite as aroused as the proponents
of a primary contended.

However, it is clearly evident

that the direct primary had a great deal of popular sup·
port among Kentuckians.

!'lany civic, business and labor

organizations had publioly supported the calling of a
primary.

Citizens from many counties in the state hf:d

met in local groups and passed resolutions endorsing the
direct primary.3 8
The controversy over the method of nomination to be
used was given ample coverage by all the major papers in
the state.

Few newspapers were neutral, for they could

not afford to be on an issue that aroused such popular
interest.

Strongly worded editorials were published

37Harlan Daily Enterprise, January 29, 1935, p. 2.
38goyrter-Journal, Jar!uary 6, 1935, p. 1.

1~1

supporting both the primary and convention.
endorsing the primary were by far the more

But those
n~rous.

Many papers conducted polls in their local areas in an
attempt to determine public sentiment. 39

These polls

demonstrated the popularity with which the primary

~as

viewed.
Both factions were aware that the method of nominatioD chosen would be of vital importance to their future.
l"or the administration,

B.

primar:; meant possible <"efeat;

for the anti-administration forces, it was the only chance
for success.

For a short time after the executive Com-

mittee meeting, it seemed that the administration had
achieved victory.

But the ambitions of the anti-adminis-

tration faction would be promoted by public opinion.
Public antipathy towards a convention and genuine support
for the primary had been manifested in the actions of
prIvate and political organizations, and in the writings
of journalists throughout the state.

Cognizant of this

support and presented with an opportunity, the antiadministration faction secured a cirect primary.
II

On F'ebruary 5, 1935, Governor Laffoon and Thomas S.
Rhea, the administration's choice for the Lemocratic
gubernatorial nomination, left Frankfort on a journey to

39 Ibid ., January 15, 1935, p. 2, e.g. CourierJournal:--

It2

\vashington, 1,. C.

The announced purpose of the trip was

t,.loe acquisition of Federal funds for construction of
Kentucky roads and the discussion of a prison-labor problem which was confronting the state.

But it was widely

known that a more important reason for the trip was the
concern of Governor Laffoon over his administration's
relations with the national administration.

40

The com-

mittsets decision to nominate by convention was considered
by many a direct affrollt to the Roosevelt administration
and the national party.

But there had also been earlier

difficulties between the two administrations.

During the

1934 session of the General Assembly, which, it will be
recalled, was controlled by the administration, a measure
to provide for state enforcement of lrRA codes had been
defeated.

In addition, the legislature had refused to

ratify the Child Labor Amendment. 41
part of the New Leal program.

Both measures were a

There had also been prob-

lems connected wi th Kentucky matching the funds of the
141ederal relief measures.
for a couple of years.

Lifferences had thus accumulated
Dissension in an election year

would be intolerable for the Laffoon forces, for they
needed the support of the Roosevelt administration.
But the governor faced one major problem in leaving
Kentucky.

It meant that Chandler, as lieutenant ;;overnor,

40Interview with Bailey, I.
resentatives

1-

h3
would head the: state gover'nment.
take only

t-VlO

Althourr,h the trip would

days, it was feared that Chandler, as acting

governor, woule: take some action vJhich would be damaging
to the plans of the administration.

hvery conceivable

course of action open to Chandler was discussed by
Laffoon's forces. 42

The possibility that he might call a

special session of the legislature was considered, but
Laffoon was of the opinion that Chandler would not take
such a step.43

Not all of Laffoon's advisors ag~reed with

his judgement.

"Leslie

~/orris,

president of the F'armers

State Bank, while riding on the train with Laffoon and
Rhea from Frankfort to Lexington, warned them that
Chandler would probably call a special session and that it
would be wisest not to leave the state. IIJ+4

However,

Laffoon remained confident that Chandler would not do
that. 4S
And Chandler might not have called for the special
session except for the exhortations of Howard Henderson.
Before leaving

~'rankfort,

Laffoon and his cohorts had

agreed that Chandler would not be informed of the departure until the train had orossed the state line.

However,

Henderson was informed that the Governor was leaving.

To

42Interview with 1:.1am Huddlestoll, Louisville,
Kentucky, June 18, 1966. Huddleston was State Treasurer
during the Laffoon administration.
1+-3~.
1-l-4~.

~.5~.
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check on this information, he sent Clay \oJede Bailey, ti'len a
correspondent for the Courier-Journal, to the railway
station to see if the governor and Rhea boarded th,e train
for vlashington.!../-6

vJheb Bailey arrived at the station, the

train had already departed.l.J.7
Henderson, believing his information to be correct,
phoned Gerald Griffin, the Courier-Journal's Lexington
reporter, and asked him to check the train at Lexington to
see if the governor was on it.

After Griffin confirmed

Laffoon's presence on the train, Henderson telephoned
Chandler at his home in Versailles, and told him of the
governor's trip.48

At the same time, Henderson also sug-

gested to Chandler that he call a special session of the
legislature to enact a compulsory primary law.

The

lieutenant governor, accepting the advice of Lan 'Talbot
and others who were at his home, at first resisted the
idea of calling a special sesslon. 49

But Hunderson

phoned Chandler several more times during the night in an
effort to persuade him.

He pointed out to Chandler that

such a step would be extremely popular with voters and
that only through a primary could any of his associates be
46Interview with Clay \-lade bailey, J'une 1, 1966.
Hereafter cited as Interview with Bailey, II.

47~.
IJ.8Interview with Allan N. Tront, Frankfort, Kentuc ky,
In 1935 Trout was correspondent fOIl CourierJournal. Hereafter cited as Interview with Trout.

l'iay

5, 1966.

49Interview with Bailey, II.

nominated.
~-J . • en

Thase efforts continued until after 1+:00

a.m.,

Henderson persuaded Zacl'l Justice, an influentis.l

Pikeville Lemocrnt, to oall Chandler a.nd talk lllith. him. SO
Af'ter a ;;reat dea.l of discussion, Cha..·..)(Her acceded to the

idea.
E:lrly the next morning the acting r;overnor went to
the capitol where he called Henderson.

jOined Chandler and t ogether
'l'hey obtained

13.

t·:).e~

"The reporter tilen

planned their action.

copy of a recent Court of Appeals decision

which had upheld a call for a special session and used the
same phraseology that had been used in that case. uSl
In the proclamation calling for the special session,
Chandler explain'9d his actions by saying:
The people of the Com'-'l1onwealth of' Kentucky
indicated in no uncertain terms their
desire to have an opportunity to s elect the
~~ve

nominees for State offices in state-wide
primaries, and • • • the ri.~:ht of the people
to have primaries is a fundamental one and
ought not to be denied.52
Iespite Chandler's assertion that he was merely obeying
tithe will of the people J" the reaction to the proclamation
wa~

not one of universal approval.

Public reaction for

the most part followed partisan lines.

Some denounced

Chandler's actions as danrerous and being politically
motivated.

"It no',; develops ,n declared the Herald Post. of'

Louisville, "that a certain group joined in the cry for a
50Interview with Trout.

5lI2!£._

52 Courier-Journal, Februar~ 7, 1935, p_ 2.
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primary, not for the welfare of the state, but for the
purpose of grabbing control of the l!emocratic party.n.53
Even more provoked by Chandler's actions, the Lexington
Herald charged:
r

It means a chance for f1Uappylt lreferrlng
to the Lieutenant Governor t s nickname] to
stand on his head before the grandstand
••••Kentucky has had many clown acts in
her volcanic and grilling history, but for
downright bumptiousness, the call of Happy
(beg pardon, Governor Albert Benjamin
Chandl~r) for a special session wins the
prize.!:>4
Ignoring the question of motive, many individuals regarded the action of the acting governor as heroic and
worthy of praise.

"The thoughtful and patriotic act of

Lieutenant Governor Chandler," said the Kentucky Standard,
"has met with unanimous approval except with a few aspiring politicians and a bunch of jobholders under the
'thumbnail' of Governor Laffoon."5.5
More important than public reaction, was the response
of the administration.

Governor Laffoon was in an ante-

chamber of the United states Senate when Senator Barkley
brought him word of what had occurred.

He and Tom Rhea

immediately made arrangements to return to Frankfort.
Most people, including the Chandler forces, eXpected
the governor to try to revoke the proclamation calling for
53Herald Post, February 7, 1935, p. 8 •
.54Lexlngton Herald, February 7, 193.5, p. 3 •
.5.5~ Bardstown Kentucky Standard, February 21, 1935,

p. 2.

the special sess ion of thE Gcne:,"al Assembly.

'the contro-

'!ersy over whether he possessed the authori t~ to do so
added to the alread y conf'us ing political scene.

Th.e

Constitution of Kentucky, while it confers the authority
to call sessions of the General Assembly on both the
governor and acting governor, provides no revoking procedure.

Contending that he had the right to exercise this

authority, Laffoon, upon returning to
revocation proclamation.

Kentuc~y

issued a

In it he stated:

The Constitution provides that the
Governor may upon extraordinary
occasions convene the General
Assembly • • •• There is no extraorC!inary occasion at this time necessi tating the convening of the Gener'a!
Assembly, and there is no urgent
public necessity now existing demanding the attention of the law makin€
body for the welfare of t~L1e state • .,...,6
'l'he governor further justified his actions by arguing that
a special session would prcbably have to be called in the
summer to €;;nable Kentucky to participate in FedEral pror~ams,

and the expense of two special sessions would be

too great a burden upon the taxpayers of the state.
In an attempt to prevent the governor from revoking
Chandler's proclamation, the arlti-administration leaders
secured a restraining order.

The controversy became very

heated over the question of whether the restraining order
or the revocation order had been issued first.

Laffoon's

train had been met at Huntington, West Virginia by the
,56Courier'-Journal, Februar~ 8, 1935, p. 2.

governor' f.~ secretar;y, who brought wi th him the revocation
order.

The governor signed it soon after the train

crossed the Kentucky-vlest Virginia t;:order near Ashland ..
This was at about i.t.:10 a.m., which was clearly prior to
the time the restraining order was granted.

Governor

Laffoon maintained that the order was official the minute
he signed it.

On the other hand, the Chandler forces

argued that the revocation order was not official until it
had been entel'cd on the exeoutive journal by the Secretary

of state..

This had not been 00ne at the time the re-

straining order was issued ..
v-lhile the legalitJ of the revocation order was being
brought before the s ta te courts, Chandler met wi til thirtyfive representatives and twelve senators on February 8, in
the first meeting of the special session.
ing

quorlli~,

Lacldng a "''Drk-

the body adjourned until the following day.

The decision as to whether the gov61'nor possessed the

power to revoke the order of the acting governor, was
first brought before the Franklin Cirouit Court.

The

administration's argument oentered on an old Nebraska
Court of Appeals deoision, the only known legal preoedent.
fttfhat Court had held that the governor was within his
rights in revoking a oall for a special session made in
absenoe by an acting governor. nS7
On February 11, 1935, the Franklin Circuit Court
handed down its deoision.
S7~., Februar:; 10,

The presiding judge, H. Church

1935, p. 1.

Ford, ruled that:
The executive has no implied power,
after onoe exeroising the disoretion
given to call the General Assembly
into session to revoke that oall.
The proclamation b~ the Governor is
the final aot, insofar, as the
Governor is oonoerned • • •• An1
other interpretation would give to a
proolamation of this charaoter such
unoertainty and instabillty that
intolerable confusion and uncertainty
would prevail.58
In oom.,'nenting on the Nebraska case, the judge said that
the decision "was rendered by a divided court," and the
dissenting opinion seemed to be "supported by the better
authority and botter reasoning."59
Judge Ford's deoision made no mention of the restraining order and its alleged violation.

Nor did it say

whether the exeouti ve order was official until entered on
the exeoutive journal.
power

W8.S

It merely held that the governor's

exhausted when he issued the call and that he

lacked the power to revoke it.
The following day, February 12, the Kentuoky Court of

Appeals, in a four to three deoision, affirmed the Circuit
Court's deoision.

Meanwhile, the administration, sensing

its defeat in the state courts, turned its attention to
tl:1E.1

special If.-gislative session.

'!'here the Laffoon foroes

direoted t'leir efforts towa.rds preventing the passage of a
primary hill.

Hopef'ully, this could be accomplished by

58Ho~ster v. Brook; Laf.foon v, Ranklin, 258 Ky. 152,
79 s.\~. ( d) 707 (1935).

-

59Ibld.
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deadlocking the session.

However, if thc;y were unable to

do that tiley could still seek passage of a prima.ry bill
favorable to their plans.
On February 11./., a bill was introduced in the Senate,

providing for t!W selection of candidates in ODC primary.60
On the sa-:ne Gay the administration introduced a bill which
prOirided for run-off pri!na!'ioa \-1hich were common through-

out the South. 6l

The provisions of the run-ofr bill

provided that if one candidate did not receive a majority
in the primary 1 the hiD oandidates receiving the largest
n~~bar

of votes wotud then engage in a run-off election.

On the other hand, the single prirmry bill required only
that a candidate reeeive a plurality to receive the

nomination.
~ie

No second primaries would be held.

administration's support of the run-orf primary

was based on the belief that through such a system the

nomination of an anti-administration candidate could be
prevented.

In February, 1935, it seemed likely that J. C.

W. Beckham would be the candidate backed

b~

the anti-

administration forces, and the acministration mapped its
course to maet his candidacy.

In an address to the

special session, Laffoon made reference to Beckham's
probably candidacy when he said that he "supposed the
Courier-Jou.,,'''nal would go and

.~et

the same old horse out of'

60COl'llrr'.onwealth of KentuCI{y, Journal of Extraordinarf
Session of the Senate (Frankfort: State Journal Company ,
p.

J+7.

611l?i9..,

p.

50.
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the stable and trot him aroun(J
tion of Kentucky'. ,,62

9.lH::

say, 'here I s the salva-

Fearful that Beckham or some other

candidate might receive more votes than Rhea in a primary,
the administration acopted a strategy designed to overcome
this.

A number of candidates or IIfavorite son oandidates lt

~'ould

be induced to enter the primary, making it difficult

for any contender to secure a msjority of the votes.

Tnus

while Beckham mieht get more votes than Phea, he 'Would
have

f~eat

difficulty getting more votes

tl~

the combined

total of all other candidates. 63
The administration publicly argued that its bill
would prevent a minority candidate from being nominated,
implying that it was more demooratic than the single
primary.

On the other hand, the supporters of the single

primary bill oontended that two primaries would be too
great an expense for taxpayers.

Furthermore, the prospect

of run-off primaries would be discouraging to good governmer.t because men best qualified to serve the public were
unWilling to faoe the expense, labor and abuse of two
nominating races.

Such arguments were probably uncon-

vincing to even the most naive of voters.
In addition to the two Senate measures, two bills were
introduced in the House. one calling for single primaries
and the other for run-off primaries.

On February 19,

1935. the run-off bill passed the Senat£ by a vote of
62re.M., p. 67.
63Baylor, Talbot, pp.

294-95.

S2
tvwnty-tHo to ten. 64

The administration then sought to

remove from co:rom:1. ttce in 'the House the single primary
bill.

If the;; could

SCCI..ll'G

passage of

House, a a talemate could be crea.ted.

thl~

b ill by the

This itJas attempted

on February 2$, but fai1e1 when they ''tIerE; unable to ,:'emove
t}16

bill

fl""O;ll

the House committee.

This attompt

deff'.lated by a. forty-six to twonty-nine vote. 65

1-18.S

I~ ealizing

that there was little c:lance of passing a single primary
bill in a Senate controlled by the ad::u1nistration, and

belleving that a run-off primary was better tho.n

110

pri::;;.a,ry, anti-a.dministration meuJ)ers of the House joined
the Laffoon forces on Febr:lal:'Y 26, and t;assed the run-off
bill by a. vote of sixty-nine to tHcnt;y.66

or

thn t'llenty ,,"Iho voted against tho

'11~asure,

nineteen

were Rcpubllciins, indicating the opposition ,Jf the mlnority party tc this for:n of ::lomination.

One angry hepub-

lican papal' declared:
The si311ing of the pri..n:ar;y bill had the
appearance o£ a Democratic 'love feast,'
l~aders of the admlnistration Dnd antiadministration factions joking with one
8n 1)t.hEH" 01.iring the procecdin,3S j uGovernor,
this is an adopted child in which we are
plea.sed," remarked Lieutenant Governor
Chandler. "Well, there will be no doubt
that a majority will nominate the
cand ida te ,rt the Governor repl ied .67

-

64Ibid.,

P.

-

99.

65Courier-Journal, February 26, 1935, p. 1.

66!PJ..9.., February 27,1935, p. 1.
p.l.

67The Greenburg Record }lerold, February 28, 1935,
-
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At a cost of

~~38,ooo

for the special legislative

session, the people of Kentucky had a compulsory primary
bill.

One newspaper termed the passage of the law a

"victory for the people by the press. n68

Although this

statement is exaggerated, it is true that the influence of
public opinion, stimulated by the
was of great importance.

a~,;ltation

of the press,

"Only the assurance of popular

support, encouraged and emboldened faithful public
servants to seize the opportunity to restore the principle
of popuar su.f'frage," declared the Harlan Laily ;.;.nterprise. 69

Equall~ important, however, were the aspirations

and ambitions of politicians in both factions of the Lemocratic Party.
Although the enactment of the primary law was a
victory for democratic government, its passage cannot be
attributed solely to American dedication to democracy.
With greater validity, it can be argued that it was but
another example of the curious combination, of one part
devotion to democratic rule and one part desire for
political power, that goes into the making of American
politics.
Public sentiment had been satisfied; the people would
nominate the party candidates.

But what effects would the

measure have on the Democratic Party and the gubernatorial
election?

Ironically enough, the bill was to be the cause

68Harlan Daily Enterprise, February 27, 1935, p. 1.

69ill.E..
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of the defeat of its supporters and the means of victory
for those who opposed it.

The stage was now readied and

the cast prepared to present their roles in one of the most
colorful and exciting political dramas in the statets
history.

CHAP'l~

III

THE S IL~NT VOTE
Before the enactment of the compulsory primary law
there was little doubt that the Lemocratic candidate would
be Thomas S. Rhea of Russellville, Kentucky.

Realizing

this Rhea had written a friend in January:
Old Friend, just believe me. No matter
what any newspaper or anyone says I am
headed for the top of the world, and I
don't believe any combination can stop
or hinder me in the least. For I not
only have a fine organization but which
is better I have the people of all kinds
for me. l
The primary law probably did not destroy his optimism for
it did not deny him the nomination, but it did mean that
to obtain it he would have to engage several opponents in
a political campaign.

And there were many who were

willing to do battle with hirn for the nomination.
Even betore the controversy surrounding the passage
of a primary law developed, several individuals had
expressed interest in the gubernatorial nomination.

In

all, seven !:emocrats campaigned for the nomination,
although two withdrew from the contest before the deadline
date for filing as candidates.

James Howell Richmond was

the earliest aspirant to announce his availability for the
lThomas S. Rhea to Drey Woodson, Januar~ 13, 1935,
v;oodson Papers.
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nomination.

Richemnd had been elected Superintendent or

Public Instruction in 1931 with a majority greater than
tnat of any other candidate on the Lemocratic ticket.
turing his tenure as Superintendent of PULlic Instruction,
Ricrwond was a staunch supporter of better education in
Kentucky.

Unlike many individuals who had filled that

office, Richmond had served in the field of education as a
teacher, supervisor, principal and school superintendent. 2
COl'nbining his carrer in the field of education with that
of politics, he had in 1920 run for the third district
congressional seat but had been defeated. 3 Despite the
defeat he remained in politics and in 1932 led the preconvention campaiGn in Kentucky for Franklin I. Roosevelt.
Another man who sought the nomination was Nat B.
Sewell.

Sewell, as state Inspector and Examiner during

the Laffoon administration, became "one of its most widely
publicized public officials. H4

This publicity was gener-

ated by the numerous official reports published
office.

b~'

his

Both Richmond and Sewell withdrew from the

campaign when it became apparent that they would not
receive the nomination.
On the day of the first primary, August

4,

Lemo-

cratic voters were presented with five tnen from whom to
select their gubernatorial candidate.

Of the five men

2Harrodsburg Herald, March 1, 193$, p. 2.

rurming on the remocratic ticket, Bailey V1ootton made the
least vigorous campaign and received the fewest votes on
eleotion day.
Wootton was a native of Muhlenburg COlmty, looated in
the southwestern ooal fields of Kentuoky.

He had been

eleoted Attorney General in 1931 and was made ohairman of
the

Democratie Exeoutive Committee the following year.

nKnown more as a listener than a talker," Wootton had
avoided "as mveh as possible, partioipation in the faotiona1 controversies

tr~t

featured the 1932, 1933 and 1934

sessions of the General Assembly.uS

Wootton's speeches,

when compared with the oolorfulness and vigor of the
Chandler-Rhea exohanges, appeared almost drab.

However, a

factor more important than this in his defeat was that he
~Jas

relatively unknown to the general public and he lacked

the organized support of any large segment of the party.
A similar situation existed 10 the oandidaoy of Elam
Huddleston, who, like Wootton, lacked SUbstantial backing.
Luring the Larfoon administration, Huddleston served
state Treasurer.

8S

Prior to the t he had been engaged in the

investment banking bUsiness in Louisville for a number of
years.6

Huddleston finished fourth in the Democratic

primary.
Huddleston, Wootton, Riohmond, Sewell, Rhea and
Chandler were all important officia.ls of the La.tfoon
SIbid.
6Interview with Huddleston.

58
administration, and all were candidates, at one time or
another, for the Lemocratic nomination.

Only one candi-

date was not identified with the Laffoon aaministration.
Waging a hard fought campaign, Frederick Wallis, built up
a large body of supporters.
The oldest of the gubernatorial candidates in 1935,
Wallis was born in Christian County in 1869.

He had

enjoyed an active political career prior to 1935, but
primarily outside of Kentucky's political arena.
dent Wilson had appointed him Commissioner of

Presi-

Immie~ation,

a position which he held until the end of the Harding
administration. 7

After 1924, he was involved for five

years in New York politics.

Returning to Kentucky in

1929, Wallis soon became active in state politics.

His

campaign in 1935 centered on his advocacy of a conservative, businessman

t3~e

of government.

This type of ap-

proach, however, had little appeal to Kentuckians during
the depression years.

In the primary, Wallis' vote lagged

far behind that of Rhea and Chandler.
Thomas S. Rhea was as experienced and skilled a
politician as could be found in Kentucky during the 1930's.
Born in 1871, he was a native of Russellville, the county
seat of Logan County, located in south-Central Kentucky.
Although Rhea served in numerous small offices and was a
veteran of many polit ical campaigns, he possessed the
reputation of being "more of an organizer than a stump
7Harrodsburg Hera16, i'1arch 1, 1935, p. 2.
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speaker. tlB

He began his career in politics by serving as

assistant in the office of Colonel Joshua t. Powers, U. S.
Collector of Internal Revenue at owensboro. 9 Returning to
his home in 1905, he was elected sheriff of Logan County.
Involvement in state polit1cs started for him in 1911 when
he was elected state treasurer.

Extremely active in the

years that followed, he served as a delegate to the
national conventions in 1912, 1920, 1924 and 1932.10

fie

also directed the state campa1gns of Beckham in the senatorial race of 1914 and in the Democratic primar;y of
1927, and directed the campaign of A. 0. Stanley who ran
successfully for the Senate in 1919. 11
Although Rhea had tremendous success in managing the
campaigns of other candidates, he was unable to achieve as
many victories for himself at the polls.

In 1915 he was

defeated in an election for state auditor and in 1928 he
unsuccessfully ran for Congress in the Third Congressional
District.

Facing certain defeat in his bid for the guber-

natorial nomination in 1919, he withdrew without finishing
the race. 12
Rhea occupied a very influential position in the
Laffoon administration.

He quickly became the governor's

B~.
~J11lis, Kentucky Democracy, p. 301.

lO1lli.
ll!£!.9..
l2lE!!!.
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most trusted adviser and was "generally credited with
having organized the 1934 legislature for Laffoon ... 13

His

importance was indicated in his appointment to the Highway
Commission in 1932.

As the split developed between Ben

Johnson and Laffoon, Rhea's influenoe increased.

~~en

Johnson was removed from the Highway Commission, Rhea
assumed the chairmanship of that body.
Regardless of his earlier failures at the polls, in
the spring, 1935, Rhea seemed assured of the nomination.
Cognizant of this fact, anti-administration forces attempted to reach an accord with Rhea.

In early April,

1935, Rhea was approached by Elwood Hamilton, law partner
of Beckham, and an influential Lemocrat in Louisville
politics, lilo suggested that Rhea travel with him to vJashington to

se~

Barkley.

He further suggested that Rhea

talk with Haly in Louisville.

Viewing this as an attempt

by the Beckham-Haly group to draft his platform and select
the rest of his ticket, Rhea refused to meet with either
Barkley or Haly.14
The only real opposition confronting Rhea lay in the
candidate supported by the anti-administration faction.
But Rhea believed that he was prepared for any candidate
advanced by this group, fully expecting it to be Beckham.
But for months Beckham refused to say whether or not he
13Harrodsburg Herald, March 1, 1935, p. 2.
li~Thomas S. Rhea to Urey Woodson, April IS, 1935,
vJooason Papers.
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would run.

Meanwhile, It-Jootton .. Rhea, and Richmond had all

officially announced their candidacy and be!~un to campaign
for the nomination. 1S Already laboring under a number of
disadvantages, the Johnson-Talbot-Chandler faction felt
the urgent need to obtain a candidate who could begin campaigning.
Then, on April 25,

BeC~lam

announced

not seek thfJ l.Jemocratic nomination.

ti~t

he would

Contradictory evidence

can be found to explain Beckl18.m t s decision.

Orval BaJlor,

in his book J. Lan Talbot. Champion of Good Government,
states, without citing his source of authority, that Beckham told Talbot that he would not

rUl!

because "his poli t-

ical career had been long and stormy and he had no desire
to prolong it.

Old age, too, had crept upon him

~ld

he

did not feel equal to the ta.sk his friends would impose

upon him. nl6

Finally, Beckham. stated that "Mrs. Beckham

also had influenced him by 1nd icating that the prospect of
his candidacy was distasteful to her.,,17

J.lueh. of th.e

material in Baylor's book is of trus variety and it seems
likely that Talbot did recount the story to the author.
That Talbot was told of

Bec~~ls

decision prior to his

public announcement 1s verified by Chandler, with whom
15courier-Journal, March 14, April 1, April 19, 1935.
Wootton announced his candidacy on March 13, Rhea his on
March 30 and Richmond on April 16, 1935.
10saylor, Talbot .. p. 317.
17~.
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Talbot talked immediately after seeing BeCkham. 18

Thus it

is probable that such a conversation did take place.

But

that Beckham's decision was made for these reasons is
questionable.

There is some evidence which suggests that

Beckham was anxious to run for governor again, but was
dissuaded by friends, who having seen him defeated three
times, twice for United states Senator, and once for govern or, felt that his cand idacy at that t.ime would not be
advisable .19

Fossibly Talbot, who seems to have been most

responsible for organisation of the anti-administration's
campaign, was influential in persuading Beckham not to

run.
Informed by Talbot of Beckham's decision, Chandler
immediatel~

called a press conference where

he

announced

his own candidacy, declaring that he sought the nomination
on~y

beoause Beckham was disinolined to do so.

}O'or sev-

eral reasons, Chandler's candidaoy was more advantageous
to the anti-administration faction than that of Beckruun.
The most important factor was that Chandler was the avowed
anti-administration man behind whom all antl-administration elements could unite.

A relative newcomer to pol-

itics, Chandler had alienated few outside the administration faction.

On the other hand, Beokham's anti-racing

platform in 1927 had displeased many Central Kentucky
Democrats who would be free to march under Chandler's
1 8 rnterview with Chandler.

19Urey "!oodson to r·aniel C. Roper, July 12, 1935,
V';ood90n Papers.
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banner.

Anottl.or faotor in Chandler's favor was that muoh

of Johnson's following in the Fourth Congressional District
was an anti-Beokham vote that Johnson could deliver to
Chandler but which he would have difficulty delivering to
Beckham.

Finally, the most favorable factor in Chandler's

candidacy was his opposition against the sales tax and his
fight for the compulsory primary.

These two issues tended

to popularize Chandler at a time when Beckham was in
political retirement.
'oJi thout the sales tax and primary issues" Chandler
would have been in 1935 a relatively unknown politician.
Like Beckham, Chandler had been e leoted lieutenant

~ove:r'nor

at the relatively early age of thirty-seven years.

born in

Corydon, in Western Kentucky, Chandler t s life was of the
Horatio Alger variety.

His parents separated while he was

very young, and he spent most of his ~outh living with different aunts and unoles. 20 Striking out on his own while
still an adolesoent, he finanoed his secondary education
and college.

In 1924 he earned a law degree at the

University of Kentucky and five years later was eleoted
state senator. 21
Kentucky's I}emocrats were presented with a varietJi of
cand idates, all possess ing different backgrounds and q ualifications.

For those who believed the state needed the

guidance of a young man there was Chandler.
2Owillis, Kentucky lemocracdl p.

21..!lli., p. 27.

24.

Voters who

preferred a man who possessed a great deal of experi.ence
in politics could support Rhea.

Advocates of a conserva-

tive approach to government had a representative in
\iallis, while those who liked a candidate with a bacl{ground in financial matters could cast their ballot for
Huddleston.

The Republioans lacked this variety, but they

also avoided the factional strife which characterized the
l;emocratlc campaign.
II
Althou~~

the Democratic primary overshadowed it, the

Republicans also nominated their candidate in a primary.
Three men sought the Republican nOmination, but there never
was any real opposition made to the candidacy of King
Swope.
Swope was a native of Danville, Kentucky and a resident of Fayette County, located in the heart of Kentucky's Bluegrass region.

His political career began in

1919, when, at the age ot twenty-five, he was elected to
Congress from the Seventh District. 22 In 1931 he was
appointed by Governor Flem Sampson as Twenty-Second
Circuit Judge.

He subsequently, was elected to serve out

the remainder of the term of the previous circuit judge
and in 1933 he was elected to that office for a full sixyear term.23
22Courier-Journal, September
23~.

24,

1961, p. 2.
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Providing only minor opposition to tel6 Swope canclidacy were Judge

r. M. Bingham of Pineville and Judge Sam

Hurst of Beattyville.

Neither candidate campaigned exten-

sively nor reoeived substantial public support.

The sig-

nificanoe of their candidacies lay in the fact that they
gave the Republican contest the nominal appearance of a
primary.

Swope largely ignored both Bingham and Hurst,

conducting his campaign as if he had already secured the
nomination.
The Republicans traditionally had chosen their candidates by convention, but with the passage of the compulsory primary law this course of action was closed to
them.

With the entry of more than one gubernatorial can-

didate, even though they presented little opposition, some
Republicans became alarmed that the disharmony which was
disrupting the Democratic Party threatened the G. O. P.
To ciroumvent the primary law and offset the threat posed
by multiple candidates, the Republican Executive Committee

announced on June 1, 1935, that a convention would be held
at Lexington on June 18, for the purpose of recommending
Republican candidates for all elective offices exoept that
of governor. 24

Although the decision of tl~ convention

could not be final, it was obvious that the leaders would
tolerate no opposition to the choices made.

These leaders

apparently sought to place the strongest possible ticket
on the ballot; one which would allow them to capitalize on
24~., September 24, 1961, p. 2.
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the split within Lemocratic ranks.
After the convertion Has called. speculation was
raised in some quarters that a few Republican leaders were
dissatisfied with Judge King Swope and were considering
placing another man in the field as the organization candidate for governor.

This question was first raised by

the Democratic Lexington Herald which stated:

Itfl"he amuse-

ment the Republican Party enjoyed because of the strife
between the Lemocrats, is being threatened by discord and
factionalism within their own party. H25 The Lexington
paper argued that the resignation of Federal Judge Charles
Lawson which occurred on the same day the convention was
announced, was an indication of possible disharmony within
the Republican Party.

r:awson in his statement of resigna-

tion said that he would continue to serve on the bench
until a successor was appointed and sworn in, provided
that it was not later than June 1.5. 26 'l'he paper claimed
that June

15 was extremely significant because it was "the

date generally decided upon as the beginning of the
intensive gubernatorial campaig~."27

The paper also noted

that Lawson had been the Republican's gubernatorial candidate in 1923 and he remained one of his party's leaders.
The paper concluded that all of this indicated dissension

wi thin the party.

Finally, the paper pointed to the fact

2.5Lexington Herald, June 2, 193.5, p. 1.
26Ibid.
27.!£!2..
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that while the Republican Committee excluded the gubernatorial candidate from those to be recommended, it did
not endorse the candidacy of Swope.
These aocusations were refuted by Republican papers
such as the Lexington Leader and Cincinnat1 EnqUirer.
Both papers denied that Dawson sought the nomination and
both charged that those who drew suoh implications frOM
his resignation were merely attempting to distraot voters'
attentions from the fighting in the Democratic Party.

COM-

menting on this subject the Lexington Leader declared:
In announcing his decision, Judge Dawson
said he was stepping down from the bench in
order to enter private practice and thus
increase his earnings. That would have been
an extremely impolitic statement for a
prospective oandidate to make, but some J)emocrats, overlooking absurdity of the prognostication in their eagerness to find some otstacle
in the way of Circuit Judge King Swope,
advanced the idea that Judge Lawson might have
his eye on the mansion. 28
Expressing opinions similar to those of the LeXington
Leader, William Mason, Frankfort correspondent for the
Cincinnati EnqUirer concluded:
Judge I'awson' s announcement said he was
retiring so he could re-enter private
life to make prOVision for his family.
Kentucky's graveyard of the governorship from which only an oocasional
Laz.arus emerges, hardly can be oounted
as the lure that makes Judge f;awson
resign from the Federal bench. 29
No evidence, other than the article of the Lexington
28Lexlngton Leader, June 9, 1935. p. 1.
29Cincinnati Enquirer, June 9. 1935. p. L~.

Herald, "HiS found which su-' gested that Judge lawson Ever
considered running in the 1935 primary.
that the opinions of the Lexington

Le~

It

see~s

liKely

and Cincinnati

Enquirer were aocurate.
J;espite the foreoasts of possible stormy proceedings
at the convention, ttle recoMmendations were made with
little controversy.

If any Hepublioan leaders were dis-

satisfied wIth Swope's oandidacy, there was no outward
indication of it at the oonvention.

Altho1..~gh

the conven-

tion was to reoonL-1'lend no gubernatorial candidate, scores
of count:; oonventions, which met to seleot delegates to
the state meeting, passed resolutions endorsing the oandidacy of King Swope. 30

It seeF~ probable that no guber-

natorial recommendation was made by the convention beoause
Swope

ha(~

the support of almust all RepublicarJs.

Tl"le Republican convention met at Lexington with
little conflict.

The only significant battle occurred in

the choice of t::le candidate for attorney general.

Laniel

['avies of Newport obta.ined the recommendation by beating
Paul Basham of B.ardinburg.

Before Lavies won, however,
several bitter quarrels and a fist fight had occurred. 31

This struggle developed beoause "of the failure of the
party's leaders to 'slate' in pre-convention conferences a
northern Kentuckian.

The northern delegation, controlling

30Courier-Journal, June 16, 1935, p. 3.
31 Kentucky Post. June 19, 1935, clip~ing in King
Swope Scrapbooks, Archives livision, Nargaret King Library,
University of Kentucky.
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a large b100k of votes, organized for the fight on the
floor and refused to yield an inoh during the balloting
that brought Lavies t reoonrnendation. 1t32
In the other contests, oandidates not on the recommended slate drawn up by party leaders "withdrew" without
being nominated, or quit before the roll call was oompleted.

Th.e recommendations passed by the convention were

the same as those that appeared on the ballots in the
November general election.

J. J. Kavanagh of Louisville

became the Republican Party's candidate for lieutenant
governor.

The nomination for secretary of state went to

Catherine ',. j'';orrow of Somerset while that of auditor went
to J. b. Allen of Paintsville.

Charles Cole of Harlan

sought the office of state treasurer and W. J. Moore of
Richmond ran for the office of superintendent of public
instruction.

The rest of Republican ticket was made up of

Andrew Alexander, candidate for commissioner of agriculture and Joseph Martin, candidate for clerk of the
court of appeals. 33

"Geographic recognition was the most

conspicuous asset of the ticket slated by the Hepublicans."34

On the ticket there were candidates from

Western, Southcentral, Southeas tern, Northern Kentucky and
from the Bluegrass and Louisville regions of the state.

32Kentucky Times Star, June 19, 1935, clipping in

Swope Scrapbooks.

33courier-Journal, June 19. 1935, p. 1.

34!!?!2..
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Republicans saw in the convention a wa.:i of guaranteeing a strone ticket on election day.

ThE Lemocratic can-

diaate later made an issue of the convention, charging that
Swope rfrepresented a system that believes in government by
a few men rather than by the masses. • • • ft 35

Speaking of

the Republican convention on one occasion, Chandler
asserted:

"The Republican tioket was named by the Hepub-

lican bosses at

8

boss-controlled convention, and then

forced down the throats of 150,000 Republican voters in
their primary."3 6

However, not many Republicans agreed

with the assertions of Chandler.

Their sentiments were

expressed in papers such as the Casey County News which
stated:
Harmony was the keynote. The convention
had a song of hate (for the Laffoon
administration and the sales tax), a song
of love (for Judge King Swope who spoke
briefly). • •• It is the consensus of
opinion that an outstanding ticket has
been commended to the voters of the atate. 38
Tne convention over, the Republicans were prepared to
wage a spirited election oampaign.

35~., October 19, 1935, p. 2.
36.!E.!.2. •• October 16, 1935, p.

l~.

37Ca8ey Countl News, June 16, 1935, clipping in Swope
Scrapbooks.
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III

By the first of May the candidates of both political
parties were traveling throughout the state delivering
campaign speeches.

Earliest of the Republicans to start

campaigning was King Swope.

In all his addresses,

1~

directed his attacks against the I;emocratic candidates,
principally Rhea and Chandler, and for the most part
ignored the other Republican candidates whom he was supposedly contesting for the nomination.

He conducted tus

entire primary campair.,ll as if he were already the Republican nominee.

At first he concentrated his assault upon

the factionalism and what he considered inefficiency of
the Laffoon administration.

On one occasion the Republi-

can candidate declared:
Of the present state administration, it
can now be truthfully said that the state
is in the octopus-like clutches of the
most corrupt, the most incompetent, the
most extravagant and the most oppressive
administration that ever disgraced the
state of Kentucky.3 8
Until mid-May Swope continued the campaign strategy
of attacking the administration.
relented in his attacks.

In June, he suddenly

Prior to that time Swope had been

"campaignin!:s the state as if it were late October, the
settlement of issues two weeks away.

He worked hard

3 8Lexington Leader, March 31, 193$, p. 1.
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although the general opinion was that he had the Hepublican nomination sewed up.n39

This change of pace in

Swope's campaign occurred simultaneously with an increase
in the rervency of the Democratic campaigns.

The Lemo-

cratic primary had beoome extremely heated, with four or
the five oanoidates making speeohes whioh could only do
harm to the oandidate

support~d

by the administration.

Chandler was not the only Democratio candidate attaoking
the administration.

Wootton, Huddleston and Wallis, all

oritioized the Latfoon-Rhea management of state affairs.
The slowing of Swope's oampaign pace was obviously made in
the realization that oritioisms of Lartoon and Rhea carried
more conviction when uttered by other Democrats.

More im-

portantly, Republioan chances of success in November could
possibly be enhanced by intensirying the split within the
I:emocratic Party.

The easiest way or acoomplishing this

would be to remain as quiet as possible. thus freeing the
Democrats to right among themselves.

nAnd the quieter • •

Swope became, the heavier became the .firing at the LaffoonRhea control. n 40
While Swope engaged in this type of oampaign, the
other Republican candidates delivered only a few speeohes.
These attraoted little attention and were of minute importance in the election.
Unlike their Republioan counterparts, the five
39Courier-Journal, July 21, 193.5, p. 10.
40Ibid.
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I>emocratio oandidates battled one another for the nomination.

As election day neared, more and more of the

speeohes of Wootton, Huddleston, 'VJallis and Chandler were
directed against the Laffoon-Rhea control.

The pounding

away at the candidacy of Thomas Rhea by the other four
oandidates was due to the faot that Rhea, with the backing
of the Laffoon administration, was generally conceded to
have a marked advantage in the primary.
Officially opening his oampaign at a barbecue and
rally on June 9, Rhea worked hard to win the nomination.

He took little notice of candidates other than Chandler,
who he depicted as a man with small intelligence and no
real grasp of

tl~

state's needs.

Rhea argued that if

Chandler was permitted to revoke the sales tax he would
undermine the financial struoture of the state.

Further-

more, Chandler's pledge to do so, Rhea asserted, was an
indioation of his unrealistic approaoh to the eoonomic
problems of the state.
Rhea was especially critioal of Chandler's relationship with Ben Johnson and Lan Talbot.

Aocording to Rhea,

Johnson's support of Chandler was motivated, not by Chandler's stand on the various issues, but by the "faot that

an army of Mr. Jchnsonts relatives had been on the state's
payroll during Mr. Johnson's tenure as State Highway Commissioner.ltl.).l

Alleging that these relatives had drawn

$'128,000 in four years, Rhea said, "naturally they fight

-

4l Ibid.,

July 1!~. 1935. p. 7.

"'4
being weaned away from the public teat. n42

He continually

desc!'i bed Chandler "as a putty man in the hands of Uncle
ben JorJ.1lson" or as a .. jumping jack who jumps when Ben
Johnson pulls the strings. "43
charges by observing:

Chandler r'esponded to these

"I was not putty in the hands of

Tom and Ruby when they were trying to dlsinfranchise every
voter in the state by denying you a primary."44
Rhea denounced not only Chandler but also Johnson.
Speaking figuratively of Johnson's association with the
Sampson administration, whioh it will be reoalled was
formed for the purpose of defeating Beokham, fihea stated:
"In 1927 I saw Ben Johnson shoot from ambush the man who
is now using honey words for hlm."4S

With referenoe to

Johnson's association with Laffoon, Rhea declared that he
had "saved a Demooratic administration from Ben Johnson
when he saw the latter 'crouched with a knife in his hand'
ready to stab the administration in the back."4 6

Also in

a figurative manner, Johnson repudiated Rhea's assertions
by declaring:
I can't express myself in the face of
the utter hellishness of such a falsehood. When Tom Rhea said I had a knife
drawn on Laffoon he lied. I've not been
armed for years and am not going to arm
42~.
43~., August 3, 1935, p. 1-1-.

1.j.4.!£.!£., August 24, 1935, p. 5.
1~5Lexin8ton Herald, August 3, 1935, p. 1.

46aerald Post, August 1, 1935, p. 1.
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myself, but I would be afraid to meet a
man in the dark who would utter such a
charge as Tom Thea uttered.lt 1
All of Rhea's speeches were not devoted to a denunciation of Chandler and his associates.

He continually

defended the measures of the Laffoon administration.
Measures, such as the sales tax, he argued were neoessary
to permit the state to meet the emergency caused by the
depression.

Another dominant theme in Rhea's campaign was

that the aotions of the Chandler faction were destroying
the Lemocratic Party in Kentucky.

One of his favorite

statements dealing with the factionalism which had disrupted the party was that there "must be a pruning of the
political barnacles th.at nave so long clung to our ship of
state."48
While Rhea was directing his attention to Chandler,
the three minor candidates and Chandler directed their
attacks upon the

Lar~oon

administration.

Wootton dealt in

personalities to a lesser degree than any of the other
candidates, confining most of his speeches to economic
matters.

Al though he had aided Laffoon and Rhea in their

fight for the sales tax, in the primary contest he voiced
opposition to its re-enactment.

Under the provisions of

the 1934 law, the sales tax would be removed, unless reenacted by the legislature, in June, 1936.

To replace the

revenue received through the sales tax, Wootton promised
l~7Courier-Journal, August 3, 193.5,

p.

4.

J.j.8Lexington Heral<', August ), 1935. p. 1.
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to reduce governmental expenses, "..hich he arr:uea would
result 1n a savings of more than four m11110n dollars annually.

If this did not meet the state's needs he would

levy s. p.,l'aduated income tax. 49

The rest of \'liootton's

platform embodied those principles wrdch are enumerated so
often in poli tics.l addresses that they hs.ve acquired a
sanctity second only to that of the Ten Commandments.
Among other things, he advocated representation of all the
people 1n the administration of the governmen t, fmd the
further reorganization of the state govermm.ent for greater
e.ffic iene y. 50
'It:ootton was joined by Frederick Wallis in his indlctnt0nt of the management of the stAte's finances.

Advocat-

ing measures such as removal of eduoati on from politics,
use of the highway department oruy for non-politioal purposes, and describing the sales tax as "an abomlnati.on,"
\1allis pledged to the voters a business-like administration of the state government.

In dealing with the fao-

tional split within his party, Wallis concluded in a
manner wholly favorable to himself, that the two faotions

were so bitterly aligned against eaoh other that it was
very unlikely that the losing group would support the
winner in November.

The only hope for a Demooratic vic-

tory, then, rested in the nomination of a man not aligned
with either faotion, who could unite all elements of the
49Courier-Journal, July 10, 1935, p. lt~.
SO~., August 1, 1935, p. 22.
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party.5 l
In hls bld for the nomination, Elam Huddleston, also
dealt extensively with m9.tters of a financial nature.

Un-

like \iootton, \-Ja1118 and Chandler, Huddleston endorsed the
sales tax, but with the necessities of llfa, such as food
and
~le

clothing exempted.

To replenish the state treasury,

proposed an income tax, a reduction in expenses, and a

"klcking out of the politlcal crooks, and thieves, be they
Democrats or Hepublicans. n 52

A measure proposed solely by

Huddleston was the taxing of holders of tax-exempt securitles, who, Huddleston stated, were "those most able to pay
taxes but who do not have to pay.nS3
Of interest to all the Democratic candidates, was the
But it was July before he

endorsement of J. C. W. Beckham.
made any announcement.

Prior to the announcement all the

caIldidates claimed that they had the support of Beckham's
fol1owlng.

Vespl te the claims of the asplrants and tlle

delay by Beckham in declarlng his cholce, there was really
little doubt whomhe would support.

He was closely associ-

ated wlthElwood Hamilton, Percy Haly, Robert W. Bingham,
all of whom supported Chandler.

Baylor states that Beck-

ham had told Talbot, at the time he informed him of his
decision not to run, that he would support Chandler, but

51Lc xington

Herald, August 3, 1935, 1=-. 1.

52Couri~r-Journal, July 21, 193~, p. 8.

53~.
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that he wanted to handle the matter himself.51~

This story

appears legitimate because of the assistance rendered
Chandler by Beckham after he announced his endorsement of
Chandler's candidacy.
Chandler's oampaign was unsurpassed in energy and
vitality.

Opening it at Newport on May 9, Chandler

labeled Rhea "Sales Tax Tom," charging that Rhea and Laffoon had brought about the passage of the sales tax "in
order to provide more funds for a political machine to
further thwart the will of the people.,,55

The sales tax

issue became a dominant theme in Chandler's campaign and
proved to be his most effective weapon.

He repeatedly

pledged to repeal the sales tax if elected, but never
clearly stated in what manner he would replace the revenue
brought in by the tax.
In his

ca~aign

addresses there was also found the

jargon of the aspiring politician.

He promised to promote

more efficient 80vernment through a "strict budgetary
control of expenditures," adjustment of the tax

prop~am

"to produce only sufficient revenue to meet the necessary
reqUirement," and the appointment of "honest, conscientious, capable, and faithful men and women."56

In his

speeches, Chandler also drew attention to areas of needed
reform in Kentucky.

He denounced the deplorable cond1timls

54Baylor, Talbot, p. 317.
SSCourier-Journal, May 10, 1935, p. 9.
56Ibid.
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which existed in the penal and charitable institutions and
pledged himself to correct them if elected governor.
As Au:.ust 3, the day for the pri;Gar;y, approached,
each

expressed confidence in his own ultimate

candidat~

victory.

The weather was clear and warm across the state

on election day and over 600,000 voters marched to the
polls.

As had been expected Swope easily defeated his

other two opponents, thus securing the Republican nomina-

In a one-sided vote Swope received 139,985 votes,

tion.

Judge Bingham 13,490 and Judge Hurst, a vote of 10,670. 57
The rest of Swope's slate was also nominated.
The vote in the t.emocratic primary showed little
resemblance to that in the Republican primary.

Although

the voter turnout was not as large as that in the 1932
Presidential election, it was greater than Laffoon's in
1931 and was the largest ever in a primary.

"r-lormallya

vote of approximately 300,000 could be expected in a liemocrat1c primary.tt58 In 1927, 299,673 Democrats had voted
in the primary.

Almost a decade later, in 1935, 1+h9,89l

Lemocrats indicated their choice for the gubernatorial
candidate. 59

The length of time between the 1927 and 1935

primaries lessens somewhat the significance of the increase.

However, in the 1932 senatorial primary only

57Election Returns (primaries), Office of Secretary
of State, Frankfort, Kentucky.
5 8Courier-Journal, August

4,

1935, p. 10.

59Malcolm f. Jewell, KentuckJ Votes (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 196 ), ii, 15.
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187,420 I:emocrats voted. 60

This sw;gests that the in-

crease in tn.e 193.5 pl·inuH'Y 'Has not merely the result of an
increase in potential voters.

uf

f;reatest significance

was the influence of the depression on voter behavior.
r,uring those years J discontent was expressed oftentimes at
the polls.

In Kentucky voter participation increased

tremendously during the 1930's.

This was particularly true

of the gubernatorial primaries.

For instance, 516,021

Lemocrats participated in the 1939 gubernatorial primary,
as compared to 253,136 in 191+3 and 288,2.52 in 194'7. 61 'j1his
trend continued even into the 1950's Wl'len only slightly
more than 300,000 voted in the 1951 gubernatorial primary.
Thus the large vote in the 1935 primary can be partially
attributed to the general increase in voter interest during the depression.

At the same time, the intense nature

of the campaign generated interest which was demonstrated
at the polls.
Rhea received the largest vote in the primarJ with a
total of 203,010.

Although Chandler, with a vote of

189,515, received 15,000 fewer votes than Rhea, he still
polled a vote

~reater

than that given any candidate in a

previous gubernatorial primary.

The other three Lemo-

cratic candidates received a combined total of 57,307.
~Jal1is

got the highest vote of the three with 3B,410.

Huddleston reoeived 15,501 votes and Wootton got 3,395.
601.£.!.£., I) 21.
62~., p. 15.

61~.,

II, 21, 27, 31.

62
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A county by county analysis of ttle 1927 anc; 1935
primaries shows that the increase in voting was general
over all of the state.

However, certain areas had greater

increases than others.

Of the thirty-two counties which

showed an increase of nearly

50%

or better. nineteen were

located in the eastern mountain region of the state.

Since

the Civil tdar, this area had been the bulwark of Republicanism in the state.

A general increase in I,em.ocratio

voters in this region oan be attributed to the faot that
it 'Was the hardest hit by the depression.

The policies

and programs of the Roosevelt administration did much to
increase Lemocratic voters in the area.

Furtl~rmnre.

the

United Mine ltlorkers, which usually endorsed I;emocratic
candidates during this period, was actively organizing in
the state I s eastern ooal fields.
Of the nineteen counties in Eastern Kentucky which
showed marked increases in voter participation, s1xteen
cast a majority of their votes for Rhea.

This can be

explained by looking at the voting patterns of the 1925
and 1927 gubernatorial primaries.

In both elections, Lemo-

crats had to ohose between an administration and antiadministration candidate.

In both primaries,

~astern

Kentucky had given the administration candidate large
majorities.

This can be attributed to the fact that the

incumbent administration was oftentimes strongest in those
areas with little local patrona 0e.

As the number of Lemo-

cratlc voters increased in the area, Rhea, as til.e
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a.dministration's candidate, naturally became the reaipient
of' n large pel'centage of the increase.
Actually Hhea' s cains were not as great as the;}, first
appear.

Chandler made slig11t gains in some northeastern

counties, such as Rowan, Elliott, and Carter been

alif~ed

with the administration in 1927.

which had
Further-

more, although Chandler carried only three of counties in
the ree"lon which showed sharp increases in voter participation, they were the more heavily populated Harlan,
Floyd, Bnd Pike counties.
increase of over 1800%.

Harlan County had an amazing
It cast a large majority for

Chandler.
Seven more of the counties which had large increases
in voter participation were located in the south-central
and Penrlyroyal regions of the state.

This was Hhea t s home

territory and he amassed large votes in all of these
counties.

This was particularly sir,nlficant for it was a

part of the state which had gl ven overwhelming support to
anti-ad~tnistration

candidates prior to 1935.

In all, Rhea carried twenty-eight out of the thirtytwo counties having greater than average increases in
lemocratic voting.
Rhea carried were

The other two of these counties which
~ebBter

and Union, both located in the

Owensboro-Henderson area of v'lestern Kentucky.

1935, the anti-administration fa.ction
advantage in thnt erea.

'l'he

s~dtch

rUlci

Prior to

enjoyed a slight

was not decisive for

the anti-administration forces recaptured Urlion County in
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the run-off primary.
The most important county showing a tremendous growth
in voter participation was Jefferson County.

As the most

populated county in the state, Jefferson County and Louisville was the scene of intense campaigning by both Rhea
and Chandler.

Although both candidates publicly voiced

assurances of carrying the county, the pre-election forecasters were predicting that Rhea, who had the backing of
Mayor Neville Miller of Louisville, and of the pOy,serful
organization of Mike Brennan, would get the most votes in
the county.

As the early returns were counted it appeared

that Rhea would carry the heavily populated area by a
large plurality.

This lead was accumulated in preCincts

in the central section of Louisville.

As the ballots from

the out-lying precinots of the county were counted Fhea' s
lead slowly diminished.

The counting was extrer1lely slolrJ

by present-day standards and as late as August 10, Rhea
still maintained a marginal lead.

But in the final tab-

ulation Chandler carried the county by the narrow margin
o£ six hundred votes. 63

Several factors account for

Chandler's victory in Jefferson County.

His opposition to

the sales tax earned him the support of Louisville's leading merchants.

There was also the fact that Chandler was

supported by Leland Taylor, political rival of Mike BrenIlan in Louisville politics.
631bid., p. 14. In Jefferson County Chandler polled
24,165 votes and Rhea 23,565 votes.
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Rhea's strength was concentrated principally in Western, South-Central, ano South-E:astern Kentucky, while most
of Chandler's support carne from the central bluegrass and
northern regions of the state.

There are, of course,

exceptions to this generalization.

For instance, Rhea

carried Carroll and Gallatin counties in Northern Kentucky,
while Chandler took Harlan County in Eastern Kentucky and
Warren County in the southern portion of the state.

This

pattern differs somewhat from that laid down in the 1923
and 1927 primaries.

The changes in Eastern Kentucky

l~ve

already been noted, as has Rhea's gains in south-central
and Pennroyal sections of the state.

The Jaokson Purchase

region had been overwhelmingly anti-administration in 1923
and 1927.

In 1935, Rhea made substantial gains, carrying

three of its counties.

However, the anti-administration

forces still were predominant, with Chandler taking two
counties and the other three candidates carrying
counties.

tl~ee

Rhea also made inroads into anti-administration

country in the western Coal and Mountain region of the
state.

In this area Rhea did well in Butler, Crittenden,

Hopkins, Mulhenberg, Livingston, Ohio and Lyon counties.
Much of Rhea's vote in this region can be attributed to
Laffoon whose home was there.
Rhea 1 s gains in these regions were offset by antiadministration gains in the Bluegrass and north.ern sections
of the state.

Before 1935, the Bluegrass area had been

fairly evenly divided between the administration and
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Bl'lti-administration forces.
ly pro-Chandler.

In 1935, this area was solid-

The. I'easons for this are many.

First of

all, Chand let" s horne was in Versailles, Tllihich is located
in the heart of the Bluegrass region.
to the sales tax was great there.

Secondly, opposition

Lastly,

Johnson's support lay in this area.

Ii

gl"'ea t deal of

Perhaps the most

startling change in 1935 was found in Northern Kentucky.
In 1923, and 1927, this area
tion.

fl.lild

been very pro-administra-

Chanoler carried all but Carl'o11 and Gallatin

counties.

Much of the opposition to tr£ sales tax cen-

tered in the Covington-Newport area, and this probably
accounts for Chandler's vote in Northern Kentucky in 1935.
Irhis geographical division of the state by the two

major candidates is fairly obvious.

Not so appat'6nt is

the fact that for the most part, Rhea carried the poorBr
counties in the state while Chandler acquired the vote of
a greater number of the

wealthle~'

t1es with property values of

Olle

cOUI"lties.

Of the coun-

to twenty dollars per

acre, Chandler took twenty-one and Rhea fort y-two. 64

Of

those counties with property values of twenty-one to fifty
dollars, Rhea carried seventeen as oompared to Chandler 1 s
twenty-two.

Tl~

civision between wealthier and poorer

counties is demonstrated by the fact that of the oounties
wi th property values of f 1:Cty to

OIle

hundred dollars per

acre, thirteen voted for Chandler and only three for

641).

S. Census Bureau, 1940 Census: Agriculture
(toJashington, 1. C.: Government Printing, 1(113), i, 16-

25.
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Rhea. 65
This division is further exemplified in a comparison
of the rent value of housing in each of the counties.

l"or

example, there were sixty-seven counties whose values
ranged from three to nine dollars. 66 From this total,
Rhea carried forty-six counties as compared to Chandler's
twenty-one.

Of

fort~-five

counties whose housing units

rented at an average value of from nine to

twent~-one

dollars, twenty-nine cast majorities for Chandler, willle
Rhea carried only sixteen. 67
There is no single explanation for the fact that Rhea
attracted more support in the poorer counties of the state.
Part of it can be attributed to the administration's
pa tronage which con trolled many of the votes 10 the poorer
counties.

This was particularly true of Eastern Kentucky.

Many of the less wealthy counties were located in the
southern and western portions of the state.

This was

rUlea's home territory.
Much. of Chandler's support in Central Kentucky can
also be attributed to the fact that it was his home.

More

important, however, was his opposition to the sales tax
which earned him the support of Kentucky's Retail Merchants
Association.

This organization had actively opposed the

65Ibid.

66t;. S. CEnsus Bureau, 19ltO Census: Housin~ (WashGovernment Printing Office, 19 1)2), II, 81-95.

ington:
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passage of the sales tax throughout La£foon's administration.

The association did not accept defeat with the

passage of the bill.

Instead, it immediately started to

work to prevent its re-€nactment.

This could be aCCOM-

plished easily if a candidate could be elected who opposed
the sales tax.

The organization thus sent out numerous

circulars to its members urging them to vote and support
any candidate opposed to the tax. 68

The activity of this

group was concentrated in the northern and central regions
and in the Louisville area.
were of value to Chandler.

Undoubtedly, their efforts
In fact, some of the bulletins

o£ the organization specifically endorsed his candidacy.
Organized labor was inactive in the first primary.
No evidence has been uncovered to indicate that any of the
railroad unions or other unions supported either Rhea or
Chandler.
The role of Negro voting is difficult to ascertain.
No direct appeal was made to that segment of the population by either candidate.

However, it is interesting to

note that Rhea carried forty-four counties with a Negro
population of less than five per cent as compared to
Chandler's twenty-two counties. 69 Rhea's larger ntunber
was principally due to the fact that many of the counties
68The Underwood Collection contains a number o£ the
publications of the Kentucky Retail Merchants Association
entitled The KentUCKY Merchant.
69U. S. Census Bureau, 1940 Census; Population
Characteristics (Washington: Government Printing Office,
19h.S), I, pp. 211-34.

!,'IGtmE I
UsMOCRATICPRlMtt.Ry
COUNTY VO'fi: LI STHIBUTION

"

."",,,_

~

III

>111
/'~/

It

./

.)

~~tI~~~W"6It»t

Counties carried by Chand~e:r
Counties carried by Rhea
Counties eapr:1ed by other oandidates

%.

co

CD

with STIllll Negro populations are located in Eastern
Kentucky.

When a comparison is made of the counties with

Negro population above five per cent
tion iE, found.

Of

Neg~o

mere

~ven

distribu-

these counties, ChandlEJr carried

twenty-five and Rhea seventeen. 70
that a large

Q

Thus, it does not appear

vote was given to either candidate.

There were many reasons for tue large voter turnout
in the 1935 election, just as there were many factors
affecting the outcome of the election.

The sales tax was

of great importance because of the popular opposition to
it.

This issue was probably most decisive in Northern and

Central Kentucky and Jefferson County, where it was most
unpopular.
vote.

This factor, of

cOl~se,

enhanced Chandler's

However, the sales tax issue was not the only fac-

tor responsible for the heavy voter participation.

This

is indicated by the record-breaking vote given to Rhea, who
was generally credited with the passage of the tax measure.
A part of Rhea's vote can be attributed to the administra-

tion's control of patronage.

At a time when jobs were at

a minimum, many individuals on the state's payroll probably
feared a Rhea defeat and thus turned out in large numbers
at the polls.

Another factor not to be dismissed was the excitement
generated by the fervor and controversy caused by the split
within the Democratic Party.

This extreme factionalism

created increased interest and tostered feelings of loyalty

-

70Ibid.
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on behalf of both of the major candidates.
One newspaper asserted that tlw unusually large vote
"was dependent largely upon the 'silent vote' which often
forgets about election day, or is kept from the polls by
inolement weather."71

The "silent vote" turned out in

1935, the paper indicated because of "some heated state
senatorial cleotions."7 2

Although this analysis excludes

factors of greater importanoe .. suoh as the flales tax, it
does point out one element.

Certainly, interest in looal

elections served to inorease the interest and vote in the
primary.

However, this faotor was of less significanoe

than that of the sales tax or factionalism.
No gubernatorial oandidate in the August
received a majority of

tl~

votes.

priIT~ry

Under the provisions of

the compulsory primary law of 1935 .. the two oandidates
reoe! ving the largest number of votes were required to
contest eaoh other for the nomination in a run-oft primary
eleotion on the first Saturday in September.

This, of

course, meant that Rhea and Chandler would have to do
battle again for the nomination.

Although the other three

oandidates had been eliminated, their vote assumed great
importance for both of the major candidates.

Combined,

the vote ot \.Iootton, Huddleston, and \<falli8 constituted
only 12.7 per oent of the total vote, but if added to
either Rhea's

45.1

per oent or Chandler's 42.1 per cent of

71u.erald Post, August 9, 1935, p. 7.
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the vote, it would give him the nomination.
Chandler and Rhea were not the only candidates forced
into a run-off primary.

Only two candidates, and they

were both on Rhea's slate, received the Democratio nomination in the first primary.

They were Garth K. Ferguson

who was nominated for Commissioner of Agriculture and
Harry vJ. Peters who received the nomination for Superintendent of Public Instruction.

None of the other candi-

dates on Rhea's or Chandler's slate secured a majority of
tile votes.

Rhea's candidate for lieutenant governor, Keen

Johnson, had 119,058 votes while J. L. W1se, who ran on
Chandler's slate and received 59,655 votes. 73

The impor-

tance of Louisville's vote is demonstrated by the fact
that three of the candidates on Rhea's ticket and three on
Chandler's ticket were from Louisville.

On hhea1s ticket

these included C. 1'. Arnett, who sought the nomination of
Secretary of State, Sarah W. Mahan who ran for State
Treasurer and R. H. Kirchdorfer who sought the nomination
for Clerk of the Court of Appeals.

Those from Louisville

on Chandler's ticket were Naja Eudley who campaigned for
the nomination of Secretary of state, J. E. Breckingham
who ran for state Treasurer and his candidate for Clerk of
the Court of Appeals, W. B. O'Connell.

The rest of

73courier-Journa1, August 13, 1935, p. 2. '!he other
candidates for lieutenant governor and their votes were:
R. F. Wright, 36,520: J. T. t-~urphy, 19,899; fI. O. Smith,
17,622; Munnell Wilson, l2,h2l; T. B. Roberts, 10,639;
T. C. l'Jright, lO,S16; and Ed Vanover J-1-,209.
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Chandlcx"s slate l,olas::rlade up of I. A. Logan,
stat\,';

~wdit':)r

general's

and,.

nO f '1.ination.

offl ce s ware -,.
Ox::.~e

i •

Vincent 'Who sought

'j .•

Rhea's candidates

Shs!l~lon

the retlU'ns of

no~ninee

t~le

I'DI'

attorney

tt;,ese two

and F'. y;. bur t.:6.

t~le

pri:nsr:; were official all of

t:-lese carlrlida:;es started carnpal;:;ning

a;;a~n.

After in-

numerable Bpeec:;'6s and rallies the voters would once
be

'~iven

an opportunity to chose their gubernatorial

candidatE) •

for

a~;ain

CHAPTER IV
THE Rmr.OFF PRIl-lARY

Little time elapsed after the August primary before
both the gubernatorial candidates were campaigning again.
Chandler was the first of the two candidates to start the
run-off contest.

Commenting on the first primary, on

August 7, he said:
Rhea's machine has hit a stone wall and
finished its course. The result of the
primar:l has forcefully and clearly
demonstrated that a majori ty of L,emocratic voters in Kentucky cannot be
browbeaten or intimidated by any machine
or purchased by any amount of money.l
Unlike Chandler, Rhea's initial move in the campaign was
marked by a desire to slow the pace of the campaign.

In a

somewhat surprising step, on August 8, Rhea proposed that
Chandler and he discontinue all political discussion during
the ltleeks before the run-off primary.

Arguing that the

"voters were suffiCiently advised about the positions of
the two candidates to vote intelligently," Rhea stated that
bj' such an agreement he hoped "to allay the political fires
so the party would be in a better shape for the November
election."2

Refusing to agree to such an arrangement,

Chandler described Rhea's proposal as a desire tor an
lLexington Leader, August 8, 1935, p. 1.
2Courier-Journal, August 9, 1935, p. 1.
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armistice in liGht of certain defeat.)
Although Rhea had on rnany occasions expressed, both
privately and publicly, concern tor the party's well being,
Chandler's

~eaction

contained an element of truth.

Con-

tidence among Democrats in the Rhea organization was shaken
by the loss of traditional administration strongholds such
as Northern Kentucky.4

Many politicians began to doubt

that Rhea could defeat Chandler's rising popularity and to
question Rhea's reputation as a master-mind in

t'

politics.~

Twice Rhea had made serious misoalculations which were
having disastrous etfects on his bid for governor.
in 1935, he had the

no~atlon in

the

through errors in judgment lost it.

pa~

Twice

of his hand and

The first mistake

occurred when the popular demand for a primary arose.

In

January, 1935, Rhea had written a friend that either a
primary or a convention would suit him. 6 If this was true,
it would have been far wiser for him to have worked for a
primary.
n~nt,

Instead, he and Laffoon, ignoring public senti-

persuaded the Executive Committee to call for a

convention, thereby, seemingly assuring hhea of the nomination.

The nomination which was his was then lost when

Governor Laffoon and he journeyed to Washington.

Then,

within a week, Rhea, by endorsing the run-off primary
3Henderson }1orning Gleaner, August 10, 1935, p. 6.
4Courier-Journal, August 11, 1935, p. 10.

6Thomas S. Rhea to Urey Woodson, January 21, 1935,

5Ibid.

Woodson Papers.
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bill, made what woul6 become a dIsastrous mistake.

The

run-off primary law gave Chandler another month in which
to perfect an
people.

or~sanization

and carry his campaign to the

In his call for an end to political campaigning,

Rhea sought to minimize the advantages he had given
Chandler.
After the August primary Rhea and Chandler immediately
tried to obtain the
dates.

en~orsements

of the three minor candi-

The most important of these was Wallis who had

polled over 38,000 votes.
paper si,ated:

Commenting on this subject one

"Conceding for the sake of argument, that

both Rhea and Chandler, polled their top strength.

. .,

the one that receives the Wallis-Klair vote in September
will have a majority.«7

Much of Wallis' support had come

from the Billy Klair organization in Lexington.

Taus this

mants influence had great bearing on Wallis' decision.
Klair had disagreed with the Laffoon administration over
the removal of highway commissioner Charles Fennell of
Lexington and many persons expected n.1m to support Chandler.

a

On August 15, 1935, Wallis announced that he would

support Chandler.

He stated that he believed that the

lieutenant governor I·would be thousands of votes stronger
than Thomas S. Rhea in the November election.,,9

Five days

7The Corbin Times, August 10, 1935, p. 1.

8Ibld •
<tSenderson Morning Gleaner, Au:::~ust 16, 1935, p. 7.
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later, Billy Klair endorsed Chandler's candidacy.

10

Rhea

reacted to Wallis' decision by charging that Chandler had
bargained with v:allis for his sUP.Jort.

v1811is denied

these assertions and stated that the reason he was endorsing the election of Chandler was because "Chandler is
running on the same platform that I campaigned on preceding the August primary."ll
While Chandler received the endorsement of Wallis,
Huddleston's support was given to Rhea.

Huddleston's

decision was made, he stated with:
The conviction that his Rhea's platform will serve the people of Kentucky
to a greater advantage than that of his
opponent • • •• It is my belief that
Kentucky will be served more advantageously t,hrough Mr. Rhea due to his age,
experience and knowledge of governmental
affairs.. • .12
In their campaign addresses, both Chandler and Rhea
dealt Dgain with those questions which had charaoterized
the first primary.

But these were overshadowed by two new

issues which developed out of the voting in the first
primary.

They were ooncerned with the use of National

Guardsmen at the polls in Harlan County and the abnormal
vote

In'Lo~an

County.

both issues were beneficial to

Chandler's candidacy.
Harlan County, loeated in the extreme southeastern
lOHarlan Laily Enterprise, August 21, 1935, p. 1.
lll£!£., August 16, 1935, p. 1.
12Lexington Herald, August 19, 1935, p. 2.
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corner of the state, in the Jonths preceding the election,
had been the scene of numerous incidents of violence.
These incidents accompanied the attempts of the United
Mine Workers' to unionize the coal fields of Eastern
Kentucky.

To aid local officials in maintaininz order, the

governor, in early July, had sent Guardsmen to coal companies in Harlan County which had experienced disturbances.
These incidents and a previous record of fraudulent elections were used by the Laffoon administration as justification for sending seven hundred troops, under the command
of Adjutant General Lenhardt, to Harlan County for the
purpose ot supervising the voting in its seventy-one precincts. l )
The tact that the troops had been dispatched unannounced the evening before the election aroused widespread crt tic ism.

In the days immt3diately prior to the

election, rumors that Guardsmen were goinG to be sent to
the area had been current tllroughout the state.
tioned about these rumors, members of
tration denied them.

tl~

'VJhen ques-

Latfoon adminis-

However, tLle effectiveness with which

the troops were deployed indicated that the operation had
been thoroughly thought--out and well-prepared.

The Harlan

Daily Enterprise noted that:
Every officer in command of the group at
each polling place carried large blue
print maps of Harlan, probably forty
inches square. On this map the final
l)The Corbin Times, August ), 1935, p. 1.
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precinct destination of each p~oup with I
the roads leading there, was marked off.l+
In addition, each officer was equipped with the pamphlet
siened by the Honest Election League of Harlan County,
"which was in fact a set of instructions for the soldiers. hlS Among other things the pamphlet instructed the
soldiers to examine all ballot boxes before the polls
opened.

These pamphlets were distributed to the officers
16
before they reached Harlan.
The action of the administration was discredited by
the conduct of Adjutant General Lenhardt.

After learning

of the movement of troops into the county, Harlan officials
obtained a court injunction forbidding the use of them.
Attempts to serve the injunction on Denhardt proved futile
until late in the day and then Denhardt ignored it.

The

situation was made worse when the executive order of the
governor authorizing the use of the troops could not be
17
located until after the election weekend.
An investigation by an irate Harlan County

l~and

jury

in late August disclosed that some of the officers sent to
the area had interfered with the voting.
14Harlan Daily Enterprise, August

"The movement of

4, 1935,

p. 2.

15~.

16Ibid.
17r.uring this period Laffoon was in a Lexington hospital recovering from an appendectomy. He insisted that
he had signed an executive order, but a twenty-four hour
search for it in Frankfort failed to uncover it. CourierJournal, August 3, 1935, p. 1.
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these soldiers, It the report of the grand jury declared:
Was an invasion • • •• The mobilization
of these men and their movement into the
county was carried out with all the care,
secrecy find completeness of an arI"!y meetL11.g 8. national foe instead of ~ c iviliaD
population in bed and asleep.l~
The report further charged that Laffoon "by holding the
order until after the soldiers were in Harlan COIDIty and
the election over, made himself a party to a movement
designed for only one purpose and that to coerce and interfere vJith and intimidate the voters of Harlan County."19
The grand jury issued a warrant for Lenhardt after he
refused to appear be1'ore the grand jury t s hearings.
was

cl~rged

He

with criminal contempt of restraining order.

To avoid arrest he remained in hiding for several weeks.
This sort of behavior from a public official was subject
to serious condemnation.

Rhea's candidacy was somewhat

tarnished by the fact that tenhardt had been one of Rhea's
most active supporters, making numerous speeches on his
behalf.
The Laffoon administration's justification in sending
the National Guardsmen to Harlan is not being questioned.
Nor is the validity of the grand Jury's findings being
questioned.

vlhat is pertinent to this study is that the

manner in which the troops were dispatched, the actions of
Denhardt, and the lvidespread public i ty 1-1:b..ich the report of
l8Harlan raily Enterprise" AUi~ust 24, 1935,

19l!?!9..

p.

1.
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the grand

jur~'

received all provid8c Chandler l.>d th effec-

tive campaign issues.
Chandler strucK hard and often at this l;:-sue.

In his

opening address, he described the Harlan situation as ttan
effort to establish a 'Huey Long' dictatorship over
Kentucky, tt and declared tha.t uove1"noz' LaffoD..VJ. and Rhea were
using

"H~nry

'Hitler' Lenhardt to establish their dictator-

shlp."20
On

this matter', Rhea assumed a defensive position,

!M.:tntaining that the troops had been sent into Harlan "to
prevent the most unscrupulcus election i'rauC! ever perpetrated in the state." 2l

He stated that "the soldiers

were sent to Harlan County 'lrJithout my request, consent or
knowledge, • • • but the record looks like anybody "Jould
have been fully justified in sending them up there."22
Rhea was speaking not only of Harlan's previous election
record but also of the voting in the

1935 prImary.

In many

of his speeches, he stressed this by singling out the
voting behavior in the Three Point precinct of Harlan
County.

"The soldiers didn t t get there until eight

0' clock

election morning," Rhea stated, but by that time there had
"been cast already four hundred and thirty-seven vctes.
From

eir~t

to four, when the polls closed, only eight more

20Lexington Leader# August

17, 1935, p. 1.

211Iarlan Laily Enterprise, August 23, 1935, p. 1.
22Courler-Journal, August 25, 1935, p. 1.
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votes were cast."23
Another issue which arose out of the August primary
was that of the unusual vote in Rhea's horne county, Logarl.
Although the total vote of 10,903 did not exceed the
county's potential vote of 13 ,38L~, Rhea received the
largest vote ever given any candidate in the county.24

Up

to 1935, the largest vote ever cast in the county had been
given to Franklin L. Roosevelt in 1932. when he received
7,072 votes.

Furthermore, the vote in Logan County sur-

passed the vote in counties with populations three times
that of Logan's.
the~

Taking note of these facts and keeping

before the public eye, Chandler and newspapers around

the state raised the outcry of election fraud.

Rhea

responded to these accusations by declaring that he was
"proud of the vote given in Lor,an county. n2 5

He accused

the Courier-Journal of trying to make his victory in the
county appear "as everything under the sun but what it was
-- a tribute to me and my policies and my platform."26
Rhea's contention that the Courier-Journal sought to
discredit him was undoubtedly correct.

But he failed to

note that others were also denouncine the vote in Logan
County.

One paper sarcastically remarked that:

23Herald Post, August 25, 1935, p. 1.
24shannon and McQuown, Presidential Politics, p. 117.
Rhea received 10,171 votes in Logan County. Jewell,
Kentucky Votes, II, 15.
25Courier-Journal, August
26~.

24,

1935. p. 3.
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Only the comparatively small population
of his native Logan County would seem
to have presented Tho:m.as S. Rhea from
securing B majority Bnd winning the
nomination for Governor in the August
prilmr:t. 27
No evidence has been discovered to sUbstantiate the oharges
of fraud in the Logan County election.

Certainly the fact

that Rhea was from the county and was popular there cannot
be disoounted as a factor in the increase in voting.

In

many elections, candidates for high office receive a large
majority in their home districts.

Chandler, in his home

county of Woodford, received seventy-four per cent of the
vote in the Augus t pI'imary.

Of course, there was a s ub-

stantial difference between Chandler's percentage and the
ninety-one per cent Rhea received.
The questionable Logan County vote and the pres6nce of
troops in Harlan County provided the oandidates with new
issues which helped to sustain voter interest.

But the old

issues, particularly the sales tax, retained its importance
1n the run-off campaign.

Chandler's opposition to the un-

popular tax and his pledge to repeal it stood, in the eyes
of many voters, in startling contrast to Hhea' s defense of
it.

Chandler's stand on the sales tax is considered by
many to be the I'6ason for his victory over Hhea. 28 Certainly this was the most important factor in his successful
27Harlan Daily Enterprise, August 8, 1935, p. 2.
28Allan Trout, Elam Huddleston, and Clay W. bailey all
state that it was the issue of the sales tax wrlich defeated
Rhea and assured Chandler his victory.
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bid for the nomination.

It earned him the support of

numerous m:H1spapers, the Rt tail Mero:t!.ants Assoc iation t and
muoh of the genoral public.
The sales tax controversy combined with the public
acclaim Chf:lndler received in oalling the spE':'cial session of
the General Assembly enabled Chandler to compete successfully w:J. th Rhea \Olho possessed the resources of the administration.

In addition to the assistance of the state

machinery, Rhea had built up an organization composed of
many county officials.

Rhea was not a man who had a great

deal of popular appeal.

Consequently, he relied upon the

assistance of a power.ful network of local politic ians ieJhich
stretched from county court house to county court house. 29
This type of behind-the-scenes organization was largely a
product of Rheatg vast experience as a political organizer.
Rhea also received the support of the liquor interests
in the state.
~:as

Many distillers feared that if the sales tax

eliminated, the state vJould increase

liquor. 30

t~Le

tax on

In fact, many in the state legislature had urged

this t;ype of revenue measure in place of the sales tax.
Chandler's campaign was not lacking organizational
support.

He had in Lian Talbot, his campaign manae€r, one
of the most brilliant political organizers in Aentucky.3 l
29Interviews with Trout and Huddleston.

30urey \yoodson to Colonel Hartfield, August 26, 1935,
Wood son Papers.
31Interview with Allan Trout.
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It was Talbot who hac Engineered Laffoon t s norllinat ion and
election in 1931.

The same skill which he employed in 1931

to carry Laffoon to the governor's chair was used in 1935
to defeat the candida te supported by Laffoon.

Starting

soon after Chandler announced his oandidacy, Talbot visited
many counties, contacting men and women who could lead
Chandler's campaign in local areas. 32

Although he was not

able to set up organizations in each county by August, he
had, by the time of the run-otf primary, es tabU shed a
Chandler group in each of the one hundred twenty counties
in the state.

The

majority of the workers in Talbot's

organization were young and politically inexperienced, for
most of the veteran workers had aligned themselves with
Rhea.3 3
primary.

This had proved an asset to Rhea in the first
However, at the same time Talbot's men had

gained valuable training in the August primary and were
able to render Chandler more assistance in the run-off
contest.

Furthermore, the inexperience of many of Chand-

ler's workers was offset by the advantage he

co~nanded

through his stand on the sales tax and prim.ary issues.
In run-orf campaign both candidates demonstrated an
increased interest in labor's vote.

On one occasion Hhea

recalled that he always supported labor and pledged his
continued support to the laboring men and women. 34
32Couri~r-Journal,

He

November 10, 1935, p. 12.

33baylor, ken Talbot, p. 325.
34The Sun Democrat, September 3, 1935, clipping in
Swope Scrapbooks.
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further pledged that "if the scales of justice between
capital and labor are unbalanced, I will do my utmost to
balance them when I become Governor."3S

ChancIer made sim-

ilar appeals but placed greater stress on his own experienoe as a laborer • .3 6 l,espite the inoreased concern of the
oandidates,

org~lized

labor still did not endorse either

man.
After tne August primary, many of Rhea's supporters
had confidently predicted that the turn-out for the runoff primary would be muoh smaller than that of the August
eleotion.

However, the size of the crowds wClich attended

the candidates' appearanoes tended to discredit the idea
that interest in the nomination was diminishing after the
first primary.

The record-breaking attendances at polit-

ical meetings were explained by the Rhea forces as curiosity and by the Chandler forces as a sign of victory.

The

explanation of the latter group would prove to be more
valid.
Despite the predictions of the Rhea forces, almost
forty-five thousand more I:emocrats voted in September
primary than had voted in the first primary. Combined, the
vote of the two oandidates totaled 494,697. 37 Chandler,
reoeiving 260,$73 votes, increased his August vote by some
80,998 votes.

On the other hand, Rhea eained only 31,114

3$~.

36courier-Journal, August 31, 1935, p. 2.
37Jewel1, Kentucky Votes, II, 17.
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votes, finishing with a total of 234,121.,..38
Chandler made fewest gains in votes in Eastern Kentucky which remained staunchly pro-Rhea.

However, he did

pick up Knott, Lee and Powell counties.

In the Bluegrass

region, he made sUbstantial gains.

From Rhea he picked up

Clark and Robertson counties and from the other three
candidates he took Fayette, !-1adison and Bourbon counties.
His greate st

1~a1ns

came in the Owensboro-Henderson and

Jackson Purchase areas.

By slim margins, Union, McLean and

r,aviess counties aligned theInBelves for the first time with
Chandler. 39

In the Jackson Purchase region, he took Cal-

loway County from Rhea and picked up McCracken and Marshall
counties which had been carried earlier by the three minor
candidates.

A factor in Chandler increase in this region

was the Wallis vote which had been strongest in the Jackson Purchase area.

Chandler also made inroads into Rhea's

home territory, carrying Caldwell, Christian, Simpson and
Barren counties.

Other counties gained by Chandler

included Clinton, Pulaski, and Gallatin counties.

In all,

Chandler carried fourteen counties which had been carried
b~

Phea in the August primary.

Of trds number, eleven

were carried by Chandler with less than a 16% increase in
his vote.

Thus, many of the counties gained by Chandler

had given him SUbstantial votes in the first primary.
The division between the wealthy and poor counties
38~.

39llli·
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persisted in the run-off prims.'ry.

Of those counties with

property values from one to twenty dollars per acre,
Chandler carried eighteen and Rh€o8 thirty-five. 40

There

were thirty-nine counties with property values ranging frorri

or

this number, Chandler

carried twenty-eight and Rhea eleven.

'l'he division becomes

twenty to forty dollars per acre.

more marked in those counties with property values over
forty dollars.

Raee carried two of these counties and

Chandler twenty-six.

Chandlerts increase in the number of

wealthy counties was due to his gains in the rich Bluegrass
region.
The Negro voting in the run-orf primary changed somewhat from that of the first primary.

Counties with small

Negro population were fairly evenly divided between the two
candidates.

For instance, of those with a Negro population

of under six per cent, Fhea carried thirty-five and Chandler thirty-three. 41

Rhea carried ten oounties with Negro

population of from six to fifteen per cent, while Chandler
oarried thirty-two.

Of the counties with Negro populatio!ls

of over fifteen per cent, five were cs.rried by Chandler and
three by Rhea.

Thus, again Chandler took a greater per-

centage of those counties with the largest Negro population.

Most of these counties are located in the

Kentucky, and in the Louisville and

Bluef~ass

~Jestern

regions.

f1uoh of Chandler strenr;th was ooncentrated in these areas,

'-l.Or. s. C(~nsus Bureau, 191+° Census, Asriculture, I,
16-25.
41~.

J

Populat ion Characteristics.It pp. 211-34.
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and the r;'ep'o vote must have contributeo to this.

However,

as in the eaX':l..ier priml:l.l'Y call1paign, no app6ul was made

dire ctl~ on racial e;;l'ounds.

l',ol'e import.ant

WflS

the ffict

ths.t ',:estern l(entucky had been the r. .otbed of anti-administrat::tOIl sentiment.

F'urthermvre, opposition to the sales

tax was strong in the Bluegrass region and it was ChandleI" s home.

After more than six months of intensive campaigning
b7, candidates, the LeIilocra tic Part J' :aac finally ehos en its
gubernatorial nominee.

Th£> rest of Chancle.r ' s ticket ws.S

also nominated, except for J. r:. \"11se, t he candidate for
lieutenant Eovernor.

Although Rhea lost the election, h.is

running mate, Keen J'ohnson, received the nomination for
lieutenant governor. 42
the intra-party

Johllson avoided as much as pc.ssible

fi~hting.

In addition, he. had built a

powerful political organization in the central part of the
state wl:lich aided him tremendously.
r~Q

Furthermore, Johnson

a Great deal of support in Louisville.
The results of the run-off election signaled tfle end

of

t~o

carecr of a man

in Kentucky politics.

W:-10

had

loni:~

l)een a po'Werful fL:ure

For the other candidate the victory

signaled the ascenda"-lcy of onc of th.e most oolorful and
skillful politicians in the state's

l'listor~.

Chandler's victory cannot be eXplained solel:1 in terms
of the controversy over the sales tax and the direct
1.j.2Manuscript records of elections, Off!ce of Secretary
of state, Frankfort, Kentucky. Johnson received 186,898
votes and ~lse 1$6,549 votes.
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primary.

Just as important in his victory was his person-

ality and character.

Chandler represented the new tJPe or

leader w:1.ich emerged during the trying 1930' s .1+3

These new

leaders contrasted sharply with the old-type leadership, "a
type 'ithich arose after the Civ1l v!ar and dominated Kentucky
poli tics for half a century. "114

This type has been called

the "orator1oal sohool of politioal leadership."45

As a

member of this sohool, Rhea was often given to the
"eloquent phrases and perfume soented ora tory. n46
The new type of leadership arose with issues and problems never before faoed by Amerlcans.

These problems, for

the most part, were woven around economic and soclal conditions such as unemployment, care for the aged and
cultural relief.

af~l-

Representative of this type, Chandler

spoke in a "dynamio and hard-hitting, wise-cracking, nonflorid" manner which was popular with many people. L~ 7
In addition, to the popularity of his political ideas
and the courage of his speech and actions, on the rostrum
he appeared an earnest and understanding person, and one

whose energy and strength could solve many problems. 48
Besides these qualitles, Chandler possessed a pleasing
43Interviews with Bailey I, and Trout.
44shannon, Political Behavior in Kentucky, p. 7.
45~.

46Ibld.

h 7Ibid.
48Intervlew with Bailey, I.
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personalitJ'; one W!llcl1 lIe;xuded a vJealbl of' genlalitJ and

good feeling in his personal contacts with the voters. n49
Chandler's congenial pSl'sonality and ready smile
the source of much criticism by .his opponents.

one paper described

~im

w(~re

For example,

as:

A rollicking, personally likable young
man, a good mixer and entertainer of the
"hailfellow well mett! variet~'. Mr.
Chandler perhaps would have found greater
success in the role of public entertainer
than in politics. He has undoubtedly
strong appeal to the good will of a large
following who do not trouble to look
underneath the surface froth.SO
respite the sentiments of that paper, a majority of Iemocratic voters demonstra,ted the belief that they had seen
"beneath the froth" an ability greater than that possessed
.' by the other candidates.

Before final victor:t was achi0ved J

this ability would be demonstrated again.

1-l-9Jiamilton Tapp and Frederick A. Wallis, A SesguiCentsruliul History of Kentuoky (Hopkinsville: Historical
Record Association, 1945), II, p. 749.
SOThe Glasgow Republioan, october 31, l03S, clipping
in Swope Scrapbooks.

CHAPTEH V
THh. GlJBLRNATOHIAL CAfWAIGN

l.Jhile the Democrats were engaged in the run-off campaign, the Republican candidate had remained relatively
quiet.

Many Republicans believed that if Swope were not

active, the factionalism in the J)emocratlc Party would be
intensified.

Some Republicans contended that the bitter-

ness which characterized the Rhea-Chandler contest would
prevent the winner from receiving the full support of Lemocratic voters in November.

As early as July 10, one

Republioan newspaper had remarked:
rlhioh ever way the Democratic nomination
goes, it seems likely that the winner
will be unable to command the entire support of the lemocratic voters. At least
a partial split in the Democratic Party
appears almost inevitable considering the
steadily growing heat of the gubernatorial
campaigns of the candidates • • • • Judge
Swope and the entire Republican ticket
cannot but profit from the internal strife
which seems likely to develop in the
l~emocratic Party.l
Other Republicans, wedle recognizing that some defection might result from the fighting in the I;emocratic
Party, argued that the intense nature of the Lemocratic
contest was generating interest among people who generally
did not vote.

This increased interest, it was feared,

lCasey County News, July 10, 1935, clipping in the
Swope Scrapbooks.
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would produce a large temoc:ratlc vote.

One Hepublican

paper went so far as to decry the fact that the Republican
ca.mpaign was developing with "less noise i·md recrimination
than characterized the Lemocratic part;;."2

Beforo and after the run-off

primar~:,

Swope criticized

severel;y the factionalism wi thin the l'emocratic Party.
ttLashed by

the scorpion of factionalsirn and stung by the

addf'r of partisanship," the Republican candidate stated
trl8.t

n :~entucky

presents a pitiful and appalling picture of

political servitude and degradation. lt3

In rilost of his

speeches, Swope made it clear that in his opinion little
difference existed between the two factions.
t~

He argued

they were both corrupt and both determined to dominate

state politics.
The F.epublicen candidate c!id more than cri ticize the
strife wi tnin the opposing party.

In the opening address of

his gubernatorial campaign, Swope announced his platform. 4
Concerned about education in the state, Swope pledged to
expand the free textbook program and the entire educational
system.

On the financial side, he promised to reduce the

state debt by discontinu1ng the 1ssuance of interest bearing warrants, assess property owners every two years instead
of

annuall~,

and oppose the re-enactment of the sales tax.

2Central Record, Jul;, 11, 1935, clipping in Sl"ope
Scrapbooks.
3IIarlan 1ai1y Enterprl.se, September 26, 1935, p. 1.

l~kexln[rton Heruld, September 22, 1935, p. 1.
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He further stated that he would remove the spoils system
from the state's charity and correctional institutions.
Finally, lie said that if elected he would call for a
constitutional change which would permit counties to consollfate and city and oounty governments to merge.'
Opening his campaign seven days after Swope, Chandler
charged that the Republican candidate had adopted most of
his platform.

Only on two points, Cdandler alleged, was

there any disagreement, and he continually emphasized these
differences.

The Lemocratic nominee asserted that he and

Swope differed on the primary question, implying that Swope
had indicated a preferenoe for the convention system.

Aotually Swope had only exprE seed opposition to run-off
primaries.
The other area of major disagreement in the platforms
of the two candidates became one of the principal issues in
the gubernatorial oampaign.
hRd stated:

In his opening speech, Swope

!lIf elected I will appoint a non-political

highway conmission.,,6

In later addresses, SWOpE: extended

the pledge of non-political rule to other areas of the
state government.

Chandler l!Dl.'ll8diately aooused Swope of

returning the state to bi-partisan rule.

Itrontt let Swope

tell you," asserted Chandler, "there is any such tiling as a
5Copy of Republican platform 1935: Kin Swope Collection, Archives Llvision, Margaret I. King Library,
Lniversi ty of .iCentl:oky.
6Lexington Herald, September 22,

1935, p. 1.
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non-partisan party in Kentucky."7

Chandler compared

Swope t s pledge of a non-political government to the type of
bi-pat'tisan ';overnment which had dom.1r18.teo the state before
the election of Laf'f'oon, and charged the.t the group wt1ich
had forrooc the C~-mbine was bacl{ir:g Swcpe. 8

Chandler's as-

s6rtions 'Here not completely acourate as many of his own
supporters, such as Ben Johnson and Billy Y..lair, had been
lea~ers

in the Bi-Partisan Combine.

'l'he ['emocratic candlde.te elso charged that Swope' s
promise of a non-political administration was fostered by a
"bargain" with Rhea and his supporters.

He

declared that

Swope hau "traded Republicans out of' his bi-partisanship
• • • and betrayed them by promising the jobs to the bipartisan combine. n9

Swope consistently denied these accu-

sations, statinG that he sought 10 his advocacy of nonpolitical management of' the state, not bi-partisan government, but a more efficient and less costly government.
This would be achieved through the appointment of

tt

men who

are outstanding in their qualifications • • • • ,,10
fJespite denials by Swope, later events seemed to vindicate Chandler's charges that some sort of political
agree~~nt

had been made with the Rhea forces.

The results

7Courier-Journal, October 19, 1935, p. 2.

8l£!£., October 20, 1935, p.

12.

9Morehead Independent, October 10, 1935, clipping in
Swope Scrapbooks.
10Courier-Journal, September 22, 1935, p. 1.
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of the run-off primar;y had hardly been annolIDced when
political observers began to project a "party bolt" by the
Rhea forces.

This speculation was given credence by sev-

eral incidents.

The first occurred when Rhea failed to

congratulate Chandler on his victory in the run-off primary.
Then on September 12, lengthy conferences were held by
Governor Laffoon, Thomas Rhea, Keen Johnson, and Earle
Clements, .. heals campaign manager. ll From these conferences there emerged rumors and reports of a possible bolt.
Finally, speculation was aroused by Laffoon's and Rhea's
conspicious absence from Chandler's opening rally.
The threat of a party bolt was given a great deal of
attention. in spite of repeated assertions of party loyalty
made by Rhea during the two primary campaigns.

In the

closinh days of the run-off campaign, Rhea had declared:
I told you in my opening speech, June 8
at Bowling Green, that I would do nothing
in this campaign to hurt my party in
November • • • • I have not changed from
that day to this. I love my party more
than the office I seek. And, if you
should make the mistake of nominating my
opponent I will be out there fighting for
him in November just like I fought for
forty yea1's. 1 2
Evidence of a possible bolt accumulated during September, but Hhea and Laffoon refused to comment on the
subject.

Then on October 7, a dinner was given in Louis-

ville in Rhea t s honor.

Present at the dinner were rnnny

IlHarlan Daily Enterprise, September 12, 1935, p. 1.
12.!..P..!2.., September 1, 1935, p. 11-.
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state officials, some of whom were wearing Swope buttons. 13
Needless to say, this increased the speculation.
Eleven days after the dinner in Louisville, the
governor delivered a speech in Northern Kentucky, in whioh
he

sl~rply

assailed Chandler's candidaoy, and expressed the

hope that the people of Kentucky "would not be fooled by
the 'olap-trap' of Chandler and his supporters.,,14

In this

speech, Laffoon gave public notice of his opposition to
Chandler's candidacy, but he did not endorse the oandidacy
of the Republican nominee.

In a move that surprised few,

Laffoon announced in a speech at Prestonburg on October 29,
that he would vote for the entire Democratic ticket except
Laffoon defended his aotion by declaring:

Chandler.

When a Democrat tries to wreck a
lJemocratic administration he is not
entitled to support. Mr. Chandler
and his gang have done all they
could against my administration.
F'or that reason I am not going to
support Mr. Chandler.1S
Rhea went a step further than the Governor.

In a

radio address, on the day before the general eleotion, Lhea
repudiated his primary pledge to support the Democratic
nominee and endorsed King Swope1s candidacy.

Rhea denied

that he had been motivated by any sort of political deal
with the Republican nominee.
support the

part~

Speaking of his pledge to

nominee and the reasons for his action,

13courier-Journal, October E, 1935, p. 1.
14Cincinnati Enquirer, October 19, 1935, p. 1.
lSLex1ngton Herald, October 30, 1935, p. 1.
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he statecl:
This promise was not made beoause of
any belief in the platform of the
present nominee, but because of my
belief in the principles of the Democratic Party. This promise was mede
in good faith and without knowledge
of some tactics my opponent employed
in the second primary, whioh are
obnoxious to any man, and wholly inexousable. His tactios and conduot
are not such that his election would
be a Demooratic victory; but it would
have be~n such as would discredit any
party.lo
Rhea did not elaborate upon the prinCiples he believed

tl~t

Chandler had affronted nor did he explain completely what
tactics he had used.

Some vague references were made by

Rhea to the effect that the Chandler organization had in
some way mistreated his family, but he refused to explain
in what manner this ocourred.

Rhea did speoifically accuse

Chandler of oirculating, in Catholic communities, a statement which pointed out that Ben Johnson, Dan Talbot, Percy
Haly, and Billy Klair were all Catholics.
Rhea said, ended with the question:

The circular,

"\{hat chance have the

Protestants to get recognition with this line_up?1t17

Suoh

statements he asserted had cost him many Catholic votes.
Without referring to Rhea by name, Chandler denounced the
injection of the religious issue as being ttbeneath the
dignity of an answer. n18
l6Courier-Journal, November 5, 1935, p. 1.
l7Cincinnati Enquirer, November
l8Cour ier-Journal, November

5,

S,

1935, p. 1.

1935, p. 1.
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On the basis of the evidence available at tlus time,
it is impossible to state positively whether a mutually
beneficial agreement had been arranged between Rhea and the
Republican candidate.

This type of alliance was not un-

common in Kentucky's history and it is very possible that
such an agreement was made between Rhea and Swope .19

Al-

though no evidence has been unCOvered to 1mplicate either
person, Swope did receive the aid of some of Rhea's organization.

In a letter written to Swope's wife on October
I

15, 1935, the fact is disclosed that Earle Clements, "hea s
campaign manager, was actively assisting the Swope campaign
in Clements' home distriot. 20

It seems highly improbable

that Rhea was not at least aware of this assistance, and
that he did not give at least an indirect nod of assent.
Ho\-,!ever, none of this is oonolusive proof that an agreement was made between the Republican candidate and the
defeated Democratio aspirant.
A personal vendetta would seem to be a 108ical explanation for Rhea's bolt and some attributed his action
to this motive.

Rhea, seemingly assured of the nomination

a few months before, had seen a man, much younger than
htmself, snatch from his hands a prize he
for twenty years.
persons.

l~d

been seeking

This would be enough to embitter many

But the vendetta theory is apparently contradictec

19Interview with Trout.
20Joseph Cambron to Mary Swope, October

Collection.

15, 1935, Swope
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in a letter by Rhea to an old friend and political advisor.
In this letter, Rhea, in a philosophical manner, stated:
Of course I wa~~ disappointed at the
result of the final primar~, but such
1s life and I am proud to belong to a
race able to bear with perfect equanimity any adversity as it comes. 21
Irhis letter does not negate entirely the possibility that
Rhea simply sought revenge, but it does suggest that Rhea
had not been so embittered by the results of the primary
oontests that he struck out at Chandler blindly

and

with-

out reason.
The possibility that Rhea was truly concerned about
the well-being of the party cannot be discounted.

His

assooiation with the Demooratio party had been a long and
ardent one.

Thus, he may have convinced himself, after

suffering a heart breaking defeat, that he was acting in
the welfare of the party.
Whether Rhea aoted out of animosity, concern for the
party, or because of a politioal bargain, his "last hour
bolt,tt as one influential politician aptly stated it,
"destroyed all of his political usefulness."22

Never

again would he possess the power and influence that was
his during the Laffoon administration.
The effect of the "bolt" on the voting of
segment of the population is questionable.

a~y

large

The defection

21Thomas Rhea to Urey Woodeor., September 23, 1935,
Woodson Papers.
22Urey 'fJoodson to Colonel Hartfield J November 30,

1935, woodson Papers.
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of Rhea supporters to the side of Swope was not universal.
Many of the county politicians, around whom Rhea hac built
his primary organization, sensed the popular support given
Chandler and did not follow the lead of Laffoon or Rhea.
As Chandler traveled around the state campaigning, many of
the men who harl formerly aligned themselves with Rhea were
observed to be sitting with Chandler on the speai{ers
platform and many publicly endorsed Chandler. 23 The party
bolt was further handicapped by the lack of a strong
leader.

Laffoon never endorsed Swope dIrectly and Rhea

delayed until the day before the election.

The last hour

endorsement of Swope came too late to produce a large
defection within the partyThe Rhea bolt did not develop without attempts at
conciliation.

These efforts, because of the source from

which they originated, only served to intensify the differences between the two factions and provide the Republican candidate with an issue.

It will be recalled

tl~t

the national administration had taken an active interest
in the action of the Democratic Executive Committee prior
to its calling of a convention, a step opposed by the
Roosevelt Administration.

This interest was generated by

the fact that the New Deal faced its first major election
test in 1936.

Kentucky, as the only state in the union

holding a major election in 1935, was marked by both Democratic and Republican national leaders as a crucial battle
23courier-Journal, October 20, 1935, p. 111-
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ground.

A Democratic victory in Kentucky's gubernatorial

election would be viewed as an endorsement of the Roosevelt
policies.

Likewise, the Republicans sought to use a vic-

tory as an incication of public rejection of the New Deal
programs.

Frustr~ting

the desires of Democrats at the

national level was the fact that the ranks of Kentucky's
party were divided by factional fighting.
During the primary campaigns Rhea had accused the
Roosevelt administration of favoring Chandler.

Even if

Rhea was correct in his assertions, it was extremely im-

politic to state them publicly, for the national administration was generally considered to be popular in the
state. 24

Rhea asserted that the attitude of the national

administration was the product of misleaCing and false
information given by Bingham and his followers.

Rhea

argued that the Roosevelt administration's support of the
anti-administration group in Kentucky had been demonstrated by the appointment of John Y. Brown, an avowed
anti-administration supporter, to a federal position. 25
Rhea's assertions were given added weight when Brown,
speaking on behalf of Chandler's candidacy, stated repeatedly that he knew that the President did not want Rhea
nominated and that if the President were a resident of

24urey Woodson to Homer Cummings, AUGust Ih, 1935,
Wood son Papers.
25Lexington Herald, April

14, 1935,

p.

4.

Kentucky he would vote against Rhea's nomination. 26
Rhea was partiew.arly resentful about the action of
the Imtiona1 administration because of what appeared to him
to be the ingratitude of the Roosevelt group.

It had been

largely the wo»k of Rhea which won the vote of the Kentucky
delegation for Roosevelt in the 1932

no~atlng

convention.

While Rhea had been a active supporter of Roosevelt, Lan
Talbot, Ben Johnson and Chandler had supported Al Smith and
opposed Roosevelt's nomination.

In spite of their opposi-

tion, Rhea, with the aid of Laffoon and others. succeeded
in

seeuri~

velt. 27

a delegation which was instructed for Roose-

Atterwa~ds, at the Chicago convention, Chandler

and Talbot once aea1n worked to defeat Roosevelt's nominaHowever, Rhea successfully held the Kentucky delegation in line for the future president. 28
tion.

After the run-ott primary, the national administration
expressed more openly its interest in the election.

Im-

mediately after the election, Chandler visited Washington,
where he was promised the aid of the national party by its
chairman. Postmaster General James F&rley.29

To assist

Chandler in his campaign Farley visited Louisville on
26Urey ~Joodson to Colonel Hartfield, September 28,

1935. Woodson Papers.

27Urey Woodson to James A. Farley, February 2, 1935,
Woodson Papers.
28urey Woodson to L'sniel Roper, July 12, 19.35, \voodson
Papers.
29Courier-Journal, September 17, 1935, p. 1.
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October;.

If.!hile in the ci ty Farle;y, addressing the Young

L>emocrats, urged unity l.dthin the state t s LemocrlJtic Party
during the gubernatorial campaign and stressed the importance of the Kentucky election in the c3es of political
observers at t~~national level. 3D
Farley's trip was made on the heels of a disastrous
attempt at conciliation by trw President of the United
States.

The President, on September 27, embarked on a

transoontinental tour of the country.

The evening before

departing, in an effort to soothe dissension, he had invited Rhea, Laffoon and Chandler to ride with him on his
train from Cinoinnati to North Vernon, Indiana.

The Pres-

ident's inviation was refused by both Rhea and Laffoon.
In sending the request to the Governor, the President's

secretary, Marvin McIntyre, a Kentuokian and one of those
aooused of transmitting talse information to the President,
had not included the Governor's name, simply stating that
the President invites "you, Chandler and Rhea to board the
train."3 1 Latfoon deolared that he had not been invited
and refused to go even after McIntyre attempted to appease
Laffoon by personally phoning an invitation.
One newspaper stated that Rhea in replying to the
inv1tation indioated:
That since the President had olosed
the door of the \>Jhi te House to him
301bid., October 6, 193$, p. 1.

31Cincinnati Enquirer, September 28, 1935, p. Lt..
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for seven months, he saw no reason
why he should come to Ohio to greet
~~. Roosevelt.32
He further asserted that the President's mind had been
poisoned against him by his Kentucky-born secretary.33
Only Chandler aooepted the invitation, but his meeting
with the President occurred with much oonfusion and disorder.
oomedy.

The whole meeting took on aspeots of a situation
As Chandler rushed to meet the President's train

he accidentally ran into a policeman "who not reoognizing
this slim and very young man as even so muoh as a constable, much less a prospective governor, refused to let
him pass."34 While Chandler was being detained, the President and other dignitaries were posed for the traditional
hearty greeting given to fellow puty members.

By the time

Chandler had been identified to the satisfaction of the
policemen, the president, who had waited with anxious
reporters for almost a halt an hour, had returned to his
private car. 35 Thus, the President's role as peacemaker
had not only tailed to foster an aooord, but had acoentuated the split beyond the hope of healing.

32!.E.!2..

33Urey Woodson to Colonel Hartfield, September 28,
1935; Colonel Hartfield to Urey \tloodson, September 30,
193.5, 'lfloodson Papers. In this exchange of letters both
men agree that Rhea had basis for his feelings. \-!oodson
states that McIntyre had been boasting a few months earlier
that Rhea would not be elected if nominated.
34Cino1nnati Enquirer, September 28, 1935, p. I}.

35l!?!.9..
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The Roosevelt administration also endeavored through
indirect measures to aid the Democratio nominee.

A few

days before the general election, it was disclosed that
letters of solicitation had been mailed to beneficiaries of
federal relief funds in Kentucky.

Sent from Washington,

these letters taotfully advised their reCipients that the
continuation of New Deal benefits depended upon the election of Chandler. 36 This type of activity, which became
notorious in the 1938 senatorial campaign between Chandler
and Barkley, does not appear to have been used extensively
in 1935.

One reason for this was that the federal relief

agencies were not sufficiently organized in 1935 to exercise a great deal of power. 37
Swope, on learning of the letters, Charged that the
federal authorities were trying to coerce Kentucky relief
clients into vottng for Chandler. 38

The effect of the

letters on voters who received them is impossible to asoertain.

The effect of their disclosure on the voting of

the general public was probably negligible because of the
late date on which they were made public.
The Roosevelt adndnistration aided Chandler's candldacy in yet another way_

The

Democratic nominee

possessed an asset in the popularity of the New Deal and
36Ibid., November

4, 1935,

p. 1.

37Intervlew with Trout.
38aerald Postt November 2, 193$, p. 1.
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the President in the state.

In his canpnien addresses, he

noted often tlle impol,tance of his election to the Hoosevelt
prog:ram.

He lmrned all Democrats that if Swope was elected

"he would be HOrking all next year to breakdown the Roosevelt Administration/,39

That 'tmuld Plean, Chand Ie 1· stated.

ttthe obstruction of social security and old-age pension
legislation in Kentucky.n4 0
Republicans, recognizing the advantage the Democrats
enjoyed in the popularity of the national administration,
sought to avoid the topic of the New Deal.

"Kentucky needs

a change.

state issues are the only issues that should be
discussed," one Republican paper declared. 4l Adhering to
this strategy, Swope confined his remarks to state problems
and issues.

The only issue he might have been able to use

against the Roosevelt administration was that of the
letters to the relief clients.

But it developed too late

in the campaign to be employed effectively by the Republican candidate.
Swope also sought to make an issue out of Chandler's
assessment of state employees.

During the primary cam-

paigns the Demooratic nominee had repeatedly accused Rhea
of assessing state employees for campaign funds.

Most

voters, accustomed to this practice, gave little heed to
39Courier-Journal, October 2, 1935, p. 2.
40Lexington Herald, October 2'(, 1935, p. 3.
!tlThe Messenger, September 22, 193.5, clipping in
Swope Scrapbooks.
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Chandler's assertions. 42

A£ter securine the nomination in

the run-off primary, Chandler, in need of funds, also
solicited

fro~

those on the state's payroll what were

termed "contributions."

His ef£orts at assessment might

have viewed in the same philosophical manner, except for
two things.

The first factor to discredit Chandler's

activities was the pUblication on September 6, of a report
by the office of the State Examiner and Inspector which
dealt with the costly mismanagement o£ the state Highway
Department.

On the bas is of a comple te a ud i t of the

department's expenditures during the period from April,
1931 to April 1, 1935, the report asserted that:
The policy of us ing the highway department as a political machine during the
last fifteen years undoubtedly has cost
the state many millions of dollars that
might have been applied under a more
efficient non-political system of operations, to the building and maintenance
of hundreds of miles ~re of needed roads
throughout the state.43

The report indicated that hlgi:lway department had become
the center of assessment activities.
Chandler's activities in this area were made even
more damaging by the fact that thl'oughout the primary
contests he had repeatedly promised that if elected he
would urge the passage of a law "forbidding the UBe of
taxpayers' money for political purposes.n 44

Commenting on

42lnterview with Trout.
43coUI'ier-Journal, September ~(, 1935, p. 1.
44Ibid., July 12, 1935, p. 11.
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Chandler I S contradictory behavior, one paper stated:

"Mr.

Chandler condemned and pledged himself against a practice
he knew was a common custom in politics.

If he saw fit to

commit himself against it, he should have stuck by his comm! tment ... 45

Swope denounced Chandler's action, implying that he
was a man whose word could not be trusted and thus was not
fit to be governor.

Swope's denunciations were highlighted

by the publication of some of the letters sent out by the
Chandler organization.

These letters noted the organiza-

tion's urgent need for financial resources.

They did point

out that Chandler had announced a policy "opposing the
levying upon officials and employees of the state for campaign funds,

It

but concluded with the statement that:

We are confident that your interest in
the success of the State Democratic
ticket in November is such that you will
be glad to share in the burden of this
campaign •••• 46
The letters also reminded the reCipients that the custom
was for employees and officials to contribute "at least two
per cent of their annual salary."47
Chandler answered Swope by drawing attention to that
part ot the letter which noted his opposition to assessment.

Frederick Wallis, who had become Chandler's finance

chairman and mailed the letters, issued a statement in
45Herald Pos t, October 27, 1935, p. Ji.•

46A.

B. Chandler to Jeanne Searcy, Swope Collection.

l~71.lli.
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which he declared that the solicitations were not assessments because they were not compulsory. 48

Chandler also

tried to offset Swope's charges by asserting that attempts
were being made to assess employees of the highway department for the benefit of swope. 49

Although Swope denounced

Chandlerts aocusations as "an infamous and deliberate
talsehood,n5 0 such action would have been normal it an
agreement had been reaohed between Rhea and the Republican
nominee. 5l
Federal involvement in the election and the controversy over the assessment of state employees highlighted
the gubernatorial election, which lacked the excitement ot
the Democratic primaries.

Little real difterence existed

in the platforms of the two candidates.

Swope did attempt

to turn the sales tax issue to his own advantage by deolaring that Chandler had ignored an opportunity to repeal
the sales tax when he had called the special session ot the
General Assembly.

Chandler in turn held Swope accountable

tor the support given the sales tax by Republicans in the
legislature.

Based on little more than thin air, these

charges aroused little public interest.
Both candidates engaged in hard-tought campaigns.
"Chandler delivered one hundred and three speeches in
4 8Lexington Herald, October 23. 1935, p. 1.
49Cincinnati Enquirer, October 23, 1935, p. 1.
50Lexlnston Leader, october
5lInterview with Trout.

24, 1935,

p. 1.
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seventy-two counties while Swope delivered ninety speeches
in eighty-two counties."52

Swope and the Democratic candi-

date differed sharply in their approach to public addresses.
Swope generally spoke longer than Chandler and in a more
concise arld logical manner than the L'emoorat1c nominee.

A

more flamboyant speaker, Chandler's delivery was less
formal.
The campaign did not lack the jesting which 1s a part
of many political contests.

Chandler, in allusion to

Swope's eiven name, referred to the Republican nominee on
many occas ions as "his majesty, the king. tt

Stating that

he knew Chandler would "pull that one," Swope humorously
returned Chandler's political barb by declaring:
You know that every court has some
t:ood-natured simpleton around to
laugh, dance and sing. "lhen I'm
elected Governor I will let him
entertain o~e and all with his song
and dances .;,3
The gubernatorial campaign ended on the evening of
November

4,

1935.

across the state.

Election day dawned rainy and overcast
Although inclement weather is usually a

precursor of a small vote, this was not the case in 1935,
when over a million voters went to the polls to express
their sentiments.
Kentucky's history.

This was the largest vote ever cast in
Winning the election, Chandler

received a vote of 556,262, whereas Svlope received 461,101+.
52Courier-Journal. November 3, 1935. p. 1.
53Lexlngton Leader, october 6, 1935, p. 1.
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As is indicated in the illustration on the following
page, Chandler received majorities in seventy-seven counties and Swope in forty-three counties.

Chandler's

strength was concentrated primarily in a large part of the
Bluegrass, and in Western, Northern and Southeastern
Kentucky.

Of course, the Bluegrass region

am~

"!estern

Kentucky had always been centers of l'emocratic strength.
The I:emocNl.tic Party had made inroads into Southeastern
Kentucky in the early years of the depression.
counties in this area, such as Leslie and

Perr~,

traditional attachment to the Republioan Party.

Many of the
had a
Chandler's

candidacy in the region was aided by the United Mine
vJorkers and the popularity of the Ne"w Deal.

On October 10,

the president of Kentucky's union hao in announcing the
endorsement of Chandler stated:
Chandler was endorsed because of the
friendly attitude of President Roosevelt and the national administration
toward labor throughout the nation
and also because of Chandler's record
on labor legislation while he served
in the state senate and as lieutenant
governor. 54
It was also stated that Swope "was unfriendly to organized
labor and that while a member of the Sixty-Sixth Congress
he consistently voted against and opposed labor measures."5S

On behalf of Chandler's candidacy, Jotm L. Lewis. national
president of the Uni ted Hine Workers of America, came to
54Lexington Herald, October 8, 1935, p. 1.

55!£!.<!.
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Kentucky, muoh of the northeastern region and in a number
of counties in the Pennyroyal region.

He

also picked up

some support in the Bluegrass region, principally in his
home county of Fayette.

Actually, Swope did much better

than hac the Republican candidate in the 1931 gubernatorial
election.

He carried eleven counties which the 1931 candi-

date did not carry and lost only seven of those carriec by
the Republican candidate that year.

Furthermore, he picked

up sixteen counties lost by Hoover in 1932 and lost only
one.

For the mDst part, Swope carried those regions, such

as South-Central Kentucky, which were traditional Republican areas.
By and large, Chandler oarried the wealthy counties in
the state.

Of those with property values of less than

twenty dollars per acre, Chandler carried twenty and Swope
thirty_one. 60 The Democratic nominee's strength in the
wealthier regions of the state is demonstrated by the fact
that of the counties with property values ranging from
twenty to fifty dollars per acre Chandler carried forty-two
and Swope eight.

Likewise, Chandler oarried sixteen coun-

ties with property values over fifty dollars per acre,
whereas Swope carried three. 61 This type of distribution
was not uncommon, for Republican strength in the state
rested in many of the poorer regions.

This had been one

60U. S. Census Bureau, 1940 Census:
16-25.
61 Ib1d •

Agriculture, I,
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factor in

S~lope'

s denunication of the use of federal relief

rolls by the Chandler forces.

It was feared that this in-

fluence would be greatest on those counties which had the
proportion of the population as reCipients of
governmental rellef. 62 This was not borne out in the 1935

f~eatest

election.

Instead of repudiating their Republicanism many

counties gave Swope a gree.ter percentage of their votes
than they had given the 1932 Republican presidential candidate.

For example, in Jackson County the vote rose from

8It.S per cent Republican to 88.8 per cent.

Increases were

also found in Leslie, Laurel, Casey, Martin, McCreary,
Metcalfe, Monroe, Owsley, and Russell counties.

A decrease

in Republican votes came primarily in those counties such
as Harlan, Letcher and Perry where the voting was affected
by union membership.
The 1935 election did not differ from earlier and
later elections in the state during the 1930's.

One writer

has pointed out that "in eight statewide elections from
1930 to 1940 eighty-seven counties, or 72.5 per cent of all
the 120 counties in Kentucky followed their normal party
pattern in every lnstance."63

However, the depression had

altered voting in the coal areas and in the urban areas.
In the former some party change was made and in the latter
the Demncratic Party found its greatest support.

Chandler

carried all of the metropolitan centers except for the
62Shannon, A fecade 01' Change, p. 5.
63 ill.9.., p. Lj.•
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Lexin~ton

area, which supported its favorite son, the Re-

publican candidate.
Negro voting does not appear to have been extremely
significant in the election.

In over half of the counties

in the state Negroes made up less than five per cent of
the population.
thirty-two.

Of these Chandler and Swope each carried

However, of those counties with Negro popula-

tions of over five per cent Chandler carried forty-two and
Swope only ten.

This rightly indicates that the Lemo-

cratic candidate received greater support in those areas
which contained a large number of Negroes.

But this does

not necessarily indicate that a switch had occurred in
Negro voting as a result of the New Veal.

In Kentucky,

the Democratio Party's strength had been located in regions
such as the central Bluegrass and Jackson
whioh had fairly large Negro populations.

Purcr~se

areas

On the other

hand, a great deal of Republican strength lay in areas with
smaller Negro populations.

Th1rteen counties altered their

traditional vot1ng patterns in 1935.

Of this number only

five had Negro populations of over five per cent.

Two of

these counties, Madison and Taylor, were oarried by Swope.
However, there is one thing which suggests that the ljemocratic Party increased its support among Negroes as early
as 1931.

The cOlmty which bad the largest percentage of

Negro population was Christian with 30.4 per cent.

From

the time of Reconstruction to 1931 the county had consistently voted Republican.

But in 1931 and in 1935 the
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county went temocratic.

This indicates that the New Leal

and the Depression had possibly effected a change in Negro
voting in the state.

It thus appears that the Ner,ro vote

was probably of Breatest benefit to

tl~e

I)emocratic candi-

date.
Chandler's victory was the result of many factors.
One angry Republican paper unrealisticallJ' charged that
the G. 0. p. lost because its members failed to face "the
issue."

"This issue," the paper asserted, "was the admin-

istration of Governor Laffoon with all its failures and its
mistakes, and the 'New Leal at v:ashington. u64

This writer

failed to admit, or perhaps recognize that Swope faced
overwhelming obstacles in his campaign to win the election.
The greatest obstacle he faced with the belief that
somehow Republicans were responsible for the depression.
What was worse for him was that he had to fight this idea
in a state that was predominantly Democratic.

Related to

this was the fact that Roosevelt and the New Veal were
extremely popular in the state.

Vith the support of the

national administration, Chandler became the recipient of
much of this popular support.
Cormected with the New Leal were two proposed amendments to the state constitution.

The first amendment to

be voted on was one which would permit the legislature to
enact legislation to provide for old-age pensions.

Since

64Mt. sterlIng Gazette and Kentucky Courier, November

8, 1935, clipping in Swope Scrapbooks.
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both candidates endorsed the amendment, there was little
controversy raised over the issue.

However, great interest

was shown in the proposal by the older citizens in the
stat.e who turned out in large numbers on election day to
vote on the amendment. 65
The other amendment submitted to the people dealt with
the question of whether the state would remove or retain
its prohibition amendment to state constitution.

In 1919,

when the prohibition cause was at its peak, Kentucky had
adopted a prohibition amendment to its Constitution.

When

prohibition was abolished nationally, Kentucky's legislature voted to submit to the people the question of
whether the state's dry amendment should be retained.

Al-

though neither candidate publicly expressed his sentiment
on the subject, interest was aroused by the campaigning of
opponents and proponents of the measure.

Both the old-age

amendment and that dealing with prohibition were factors in
the large vote in the general election. 66
Chandler's victory was also, in a large measure, a
personal victory.

He possessed great popular appeal for

Kentuckians in the 1930's.

His opposition to the sales tax

had earned him many supporters.

And his action in calling

the special session of th.e legislature to enact a primary
65urey vJoodson to Samuel Blythe, November 6, 1935,
\IIJoodson Papers.
66Courier-Journal, November 8-9, 1935, p. 1. The vote
on the prohibition amendment was 376,116 for and 285,11l0
aBainst. The old-age amendment was passed with a 600,000
maj ority.

law made him a proven man of action.

In both of these

fights, Chandler appeared as the champion of popular government and the poor.
Of great importance in Chandler's victory was the support given him by various organizations and interest
groups.

He received the assistance of various labor organ-

izations such as the United Mine Workers, many Railroad
Brotherhoods and the state Federation of Labor.
tion he received the support of business.

In addi-

Kentucky's

Retail Merchants Association had been one of the earliest
supporters of Chandler's candidacy.

The help of this group

was of particular importance in Northern Kentucky and the
Louisville area.
Confronted by the opposition of organized labor, many
business leaders, the national administration, and Chandler's own popular! ty, Swope was defeated.

It is doubtful

that any Republican candidate could have done better than
Swope.

It has already been noted that he achieved greater

success than had other Republicans candidates in the state
in that decade.

Chandler enjoyed all of the advantages

and he wisely used them.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSION
Chandler's election as governor marked the end of one
of the most exoiting politioal contests in Kentucky's
history.

The reasons for his viotory are many_

One of

the most important factors in his suooessful bid for the
gubernatorial election was the depression and the eoonomio
hardships whioh many people suffered as a result of it.
Luring this period, as the basic tenets of Amerioan society
were being given their greatest trial, Kentuokians showed a
tremendous interest in political affairs.

This interest

was demonstrated in record-breaking turnouts on election
days.

Although Republican voters also showed a greater

interest in political questions, the increase was of greatest benefit to the Demooratic Party and its candidate.
Because many people blamed the Republioan Party for the
depression the Demooratio party was looked upon with new
and greater favor.

However, this merely added to the

majority the Democratic Party had held in the state sinoe
the Civil \\Jar.
Another factor related to the depression which played
a major part in Chandler's victory, was the New 1.eal program of the Roosevelt

ad~nistration.

Such measures as

old-age assistance and social security were extremely
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popular in the state.

Although Swope, the G.O.P. candidate

endorsed these and other New Deal measures, Chandler enjoyed the advantaGe of representing the political party
that was most responsible for them.
The prestige and popularity of the President in the
state was also of great value to Chandler.

Roosevelt's

endorsement and active support probably gained for Chandler
many votes.
by

The significance of this factor is indicated

Swope's avoidance of any discussion of the national

administration and by his call for a concentration on the
problems of the state.
The Roosevelt administration gave more than indirect

support to Chandler.

Officials, such as Postmaster General

Farley, visited Kentucky on behalf of trw Democratic gubernatorial candidate.

In addition, Senators Barkley and M.

M. Logan spoke throughout the state, urging the election of
Chandler.

Further assistance was rendered by the Roosevelt

administration in the form of letters to Kentuckians who
were on national welfare rolls.

These letters implied that

the continuation of New Veal programs depended on Chandler's election.

The assistance and influence of the Roose-

velt administration was thus one of the most significant
factors in Chandler's victory over the Republican candidate.

But it can also be attributed as a factor in his

defeat of Rhea.

It was the contention of the Rhea forces

that Roosevelt supported Chandler in the primary contests.
Al though there is little evidence of this, the charge did
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not harm Chandler.

On the oontrary, the idea that the

President favored Chandler probably aided him.
Part of Chandler's sucoess oan be attributed to the
support given him by
the state.

l~bor

and business organizations in

Businessmen who opposed the sales tax were

early supporters of the Demooratic candidate.

And virtu-

ally all the large labor organizations endorsed Chandler's
oandidacy.

Their in£luence was seen in the votes of the

industrial areas and in the coal-mining district of southeastern Kentuoky.
The nature of Kentuoky politics from 1931 to 1935 was
also a major oause of Chandler's election.

The extreme

factionalism of l;emocratic politics in this period attracted widespread attention.

~nis

undoubtedly increased

voter participation, particularly in the primary elections.
Continually during this period the Laffoon-Rhea faction of
the party advooated measures wlrlch were counter to public
sentiment.

In eaoh oase, Chandler acourately sensing

public reaction, gave his support to the more popular
cause.
In 1931 Chandler was an obsoure political figure.

1935 he was among the best known men of the state.

By

Early

in the Laffoon administration, dIfferences which occurred
during the nominating convention reappeared.
ler emerged as the anti-administration leader.

Soon ChandHis oppo-

sition to tne sales tax and his role in the primary controversy mB.de him the best candidate the anti-administration

faction could run.

It also accounted for his popularity

with voters and for a great many of the votes he received
in the primary elections and in the general election.
Chandler's term as governor proved to be one of the
most productive in the state's history.

True to his cam-

paign promises he reorganized the state government along
more effioient lines suggested by a team of experts, and
oalled a special session of the General Assembly which repealed the sales tax.

Furthermore, he reduced the state's

debt while providing for the neoessary relief measures.
Although the factionalism within the Democratio Party
was not ended in 1935, not since that year has it been so
intense or disruptive.

In 1938 Chandler alienated many in

the party by opposing Barkley for the senatorial nomination.

The following year, Keen Johnson, who was largely

acceptable to both groups, won the gubernatorial nomination.
Despite the fact that the election did not end completely the factionalism, it did signal the final death of
bi-partisan rule.

Laffoon, after his break with many of

his own party members, had once again sought the aid of
Republicans.

This type of system was thoroughly discred-

ited and has not reappeared.
The 1935 gubernatorial election was significant because it saw the emergence of a new type of leadership.
Chandler represented a dynamic, youthful type of public
official who appeared able to cope with the monumental

problems facine the society.

Because of him, the people of

the state v!Ould always make their partyts political nomiroation.

Even more persuasive to mIDly voters, was the fact

that he had opposed the sales tax before its passage and
thus appeared a champion of the poor and downtrodden.

Al-

though his election appeared to many as a Victory for the
laborer, farmer and coal miner, it was also a victory for
many business interests which opposed the sales tax.
Few political contests in the state's lustory can
equal the 1935 election in controversy, colorfulness or
excitement.
polls.

In none was more interest demonstrated at the
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